SUPER BOWL XLVIII REPORT
FOR THE NEW JERSEY TRANSIT CORPORATION
BOARD OF DIRECTORS

PREPARED BY:
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Dubbed the first “Mass Transit Super Bowl,” Super Bowl XLVIII more than lived up to its billing as over one third of the guests opted for public transportation on game day. In preparing for the event, NJ TRANSIT expected a much smaller crowd. Estimates developed throughout the planning process forecast ridership volume of between 8,000 and 13,000 fans. Demand of that level would have been typical for a MetLife Stadium event and well within the rail system’s physical constraints. Instead, fans on game day opted for NJ TRANSIT as walk-up sales of approximately 21,500 tickets led to a record in-bound crowd of 28,031 fans and an even larger out-bound crowd of 35,264 fans. NJ TRANSIT, with the assistance of law enforcement and the New Jersey Sports & Exposition Authority, among others, safely transported all of these people on Super Bowl Sunday. The large crowds, however, resulted in long delays.

Publicly, NJ TRANSIT has been criticized for not being prepared to handle the unexpected demand. The rail system, however, can only move approximately 12,000 to 13,000 passengers per hour from Meadowlands Station. Without costly infrastructure improvements, more planning would not have materially increased this limited capacity. Running at optimum efficiency, the rail system can carry 35,264 passengers out of MetLife Stadium in approximately two and a half to three hours. Due to some glitches, it took a little longer, but NJ TRANSIT still safely cleared all post-game passengers in three and a half hours.

This does not mean there were no other options to move guests more quickly. NJ TRANSIT had approximately 300 buses at its disposal for emergency purposes on Super Bowl Sunday. These buses were intended to serve as a “last resort” in the event of a rail service disruption. In light of the large in-bound crowd, NJ TRANSIT officials met just before kickoff
to discuss the possibility of deploying the buses to help ease the post-game crowd. After a lengthy debate, NJ TRANSIT decided against activating emergency bus service. This decision was influenced by three main factors.

First, NJ TRANSIT did not want to be left without a safety net in the event there was a service disruption along the Northeast Corridor or elsewhere in the transit system. If the buses were already in use, NJ TRANSIT was concerned that it might not have adequate resources to promptly respond to an emergency.

Second, NJ TRANSIT did not believe the buses would materially decrease wait times. Due to the layout of the Super Bowl Campus and the extended security perimeter, NJ TRANSIT had a small loading area along West Peripheral Road to conduct emergency bus operations. With this limited geography, NJ TRANSIT could load approximately ten buses every ten minutes, which equated to about 2,500 to 3,000 passengers per hour. At that rate, if the buses were used, the time to clear the crowd would have been reduced by about fifteen to thirty minutes. This incremental improvement was not seen as adequate enough to sacrifice the safety net.

Third, NJ TRANSIT’s decision was guided by the heavy crowding experienced earlier in the day at Secaucus Junction and the desire to avoid a similar situation on egress. Secaucus Junction is a transportation hub with limited physical space. On ingress, Secaucus Junction was heavily congested as fans flocked to the station hours before the first train to the Meadowlands was scheduled to depart. The crowding became so severe that NJ TRANSIT was forced, at one point, to temporarily halt in-bound traffic from NY Penn Station so that it could ease crowding at the station. NJ TRANSIT considered it safer for the crowd to wait in the Stadium parking lot.
instead of the smaller confines of Secaucus Junction. As a result, NJ TRANSIT relocated the buses to Secaucus, instead of the Meadowlands, and put them on standby in case the station became overwhelmed. Secaucus Junction, however, did not experience significant post-game crowding. NJ TRANSIT was able to time its service out of Secaucus Junction so that trains were ready to handle the influx of passengers arriving at the station from the game.

Eventually, some of the buses were shifted to MetLife Stadium. They arrived late in the egress process, at 11:25 p.m., and had a negligible impact. In the end, NJ TRANSIT rail transported 33,397 guests from Meadowlands Station to Secaucus Junction, and NJ TRANSIT bus transported another 1,867 guests from MetLife Stadium to Port Authority Bus Terminal in New York. All guests were transported safely.

Against this backdrop, McElroy, Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter, LLP was retained by the NJ TRANSIT Board of Directors to evaluate NJ TRANSIT’s Super Bowl service with the goal of identifying lessons learned to help improve future performance. In broad strokes, this report recounts the Super Bowl planning process and details NJ TRANSIT’s game-day service. In doing so, the report focuses on areas of perceived shortcomings, including: (i) efforts to estimate the number of train riders on Super Bowl Sunday, (ii) complaints of excessive crowding and heat at Secaucus Junction during ingress, (iii) NJ TRANSIT’s decision against immediately deploying buses to deal with the post-game crowd, (iv) circumstances that prevented post-game rail service from achieving optimum efficiency, and (v) the overall length of time it took to clear the post-game crowd.

Generally, we believe the criticisms of NJ TRANSIT’s performance are misplaced. The Meadowlands rail system has a limited hourly capacity. It was not built to quickly handle the
volume of passengers encountered on Super Bowl Sunday. While the operation could have been more efficient, NJ TRANSIT moved the record crowd without injury and accommodated all who chose mass transit. Nobody was turned away. Under the circumstances, NJ TRANSIT performed well on Super Bowl Sunday, but it recognizes improvements can be made. Indeed, we have seen an organization committed to learning from this experience. Based on our interactions with the leadership team, we are confident that future MetLife stadium services will be enhanced as a result.
II. SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION

A. Scope of Engagement

Following the Super Bowl, the NJ TRANSIT Board of Directors authorized “an evaluation” of its Super Bowl performance.¹ As NJ TRANSIT is “always striving to improve,” the Board wanted to “look at what NJ TRANSIT might have done better or different, and what did or did not happen.”² The purpose of the evaluation was to highlight successes as well as areas for improvement. Vice Chairman Bruce Meisel and Board Member Jamie Finkle were tasked with leading the review.

To that end, the New Jersey Transit Corporation Board of Directors retained McElroy, Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter, LLP (“MDMC”) as special counsel. MDMC was charged with “provid[ing] legal advice in anticipation of litigation pertaining to issues that have arisen - or which may arise - from NJ TRANSIT’s public transportation service to and from Met Life Stadium on . . . Super Bowl Sunday 2014.”³ The NJ TRANSIT Board also asked MDMC to perform “an impartial evaluation” and report on “things that were done well,” “mediocre or poorly” so as “to assist [NJ TRANSIT] in the future.” We were not asked to review, nor did we review, NJ TRANSIT’s Super Bowl expenses.

B. MDMC Investigatory Team

The Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh, U.S.D.J. (ret.) and Walter F. Timpone led the MDMC investigatory effort. Walter R. Krzastek, Florina Moldovan and Andrew Gimigliano were the other key members of the MDMC team.

Dennis M. Cavanaugh is co-chair of MDM&C’s Mediation and ADR Practice Group. He is a former United States District Judge and United States Magistrate Judge. He was
appointed U.S. District Judge for the District of New Jersey by President Clinton in September 2000, where he served until he retired in January 2014. Before his appointment, Judge Cavanaugh served as a United States Magistrate Judge from January of 1993 to 2000. During his tenure on the bench, he authored numerous published and unpublished opinions. Before his appointment, he was a Certified Civil Trial Attorney with extensive private practice experience.

Judge Cavanaugh received his J.D. from Seton Hall University School of Law and his B.A. from Morehead State University. He served as a law clerk to the Honorable Francis Hayden of the New Jersey Superior Court.

Walter F. Timpone is a Partner in MDMC’s Morristown office. His practice focuses in the areas of white collar criminal work, corporate internal investigations, health care compliance and defense, labor law for labor unions and complex civil litigation. He also presently serves as a Commissioner on the New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission (“ELEC”), where he employs his experience in campaign finance regulations and laws.

Mr. Timpone has been listed as a Super Lawyer in New Jersey since its inception in 2005 and was listed in the Top 100 New Jersey Lawyers for 2009 and 2010. In addition, Mr. Timpone is recognized in 2014 Chambers USA as a leading lawyer in the area of Litigation: White-Collar Crime & Government Investigations. He was also the sole recipient of the Client’s Choice Award for 2014 in New Jersey.

Before joining MDMC, Mr. Timpone served as an Assistant United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey for eleven years. At the United States Attorney's Office, he was the Chief of Special Prosecutions, where he led the prosecutions and convictions of nearly twenty-five public officials for corruption and fraud against the public. He has also served, at the
appointment of N.J. Attorney General John Farmer, on the panel charged by Governor Whitman with investigating issues surrounding the Department of Motor Vehicles Inspection Program. He acted as Election Monitor in Passaic County for the Department of Justice and was charged with ensuring the voting rights of Latino citizens. He acted as ombudsman to the United States Department of Defense overseeing a Defense Department contractor who entered a guilty plea concerning failed parts prepared for inclusion in Patriot missiles.

He received his J.D. from Seton Hall University School of Law, his M.A. from New York University and his B.A. from St. Francis College. He served as a law clerk to the Honorable Vincent P. Biunno, United States District Court, District of New Jersey.

Walter R. Krzastek is a Partner in MDMC’s Morristown office. His practice focuses on white collar criminal defense, corporate internal investigations, health care fraud and abuse, health care compliance and complex commercial litigation. He has extensive experience conducting nationwide internal investigations, including investigations of alleged violations of federal laws, off-label promotion, anti-kickback violations, and conflicts of interest.

He received his J.D. from Duke University School of Law and his B.A. from Boston College. He served as a law clerk to the Honorable Stephen Skillman, New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division.

Florina A. Moldovan is a Partner in MDMC’s Morristown office. She practices primarily in the areas of complex commercial litigation, employment litigation and advice, business disputes and intellectual property matters. Ms. Moldovan also participates in the professional development and training programs of the firm and the firm’s litigation support and technology efforts, specializing in e-discovery.
She is a 1981 graduate of Colorado State University and a 1991 graduate of Seton Hall University School of Law.

*Andrew Gimigliano* is an Associate in MDMC’s Morristown office. He practices in the firm’s commercial services group. Mr. Gimigliano received his B.A. from the University of Delaware and his J.D. from Rutgers School of Law—Newark, where he served as Editor-in-Chief of the *Rutgers Law Review*. Before joining the firm, Mr. Gimigliano served as a law clerk for the Honorable Jaynee LaVecchia, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of New Jersey.

C. Work Performed

As part of our investigation, we interviewed senior-level executives and managers from NJ TRANSIT, including, among many others, former Executive Director James Weinstein, Kevin O’Connor (former Vice President and General Manager, Rail Operations), Joyce Gallagher (former Vice President and General Manager, Bus Operations), Richard Andreski (Rail Operations Chief of Staff), Manny Cuoto (Assistant Superintendent, NJ TRANSIT) and Michael Kilcoyne (Deputy General Manager, Bus Operations). We also interviewed former DOT Commissioner James Simpson, high ranking officials from the New Jersey State Police (“NJSP”) and the NJ TRANSIT Police Department (“NJTPD”), New Jersey Sports & Exposition Authority (“NJSEA”) executives, NFL employees and contractors, and NJ TRANSIT consultants. Only a former member of the NY/NJ Host Committee declined our interview request because she believed a confidentiality agreement precluded her from speaking to us.

We also performed a comprehensive review of hard-copy and electronic documents. This review included, among other things, emails, Outlook calendars, social media postings, NJ TRANSIT Super Bowl Operations Playbook, NJ TRANSIT Bus Operations Super Bowl XLVIII

We also reviewed extensive video recordings of the ingress and egress process. We reviewed Meadowlands Station video from December 15, 2013 (loading for a regular season football game) from four different camera angles, Meadowlands Station Super Bowl Sunday video from four different camera angles, Pavilion 6 Super Bowl Sunday video from eight different camera angles, and Secaucus Junction Super Bowl Sunday video from eight different camera angles. In addition, we reviewed NJ TRANSIT Super Bowl Sunday radio recordings and conducted site inspections of Secaucus Junction and Meadowlands Station.

D. Cooperation

We greatly appreciate the substantial assistance we received throughout our investigation from NJ TRANSIT, NJTPD, NJSP, NJSEA and the NFL. They all voluntarily made their executives, officers, employees and contractors available for interviews and provided us with needed documents, videos and photographs. We understand that third parties, like the NJSP, NJSEA and the NFL, did not have to cooperate with us, but we could not have performed a thorough review without their generous help.

We would like to specially recognize the valuable assistance of Board Secretary Joyce Zuczek. Ms. Zuczek was our point person at NJ TRANSIT. She tirelessly arranged interviews, tracked down documents, answered our questions and put us in touch with the right people. We are indebted to her. We would also like to thank the Board project leaders—Bruce Meisel and
Jamie Finkle. They graciously volunteered their time to attend critical interviews and provided leadership and guidance throughout the project.
III. BACKGROUND

A. Overview of NJ TRANSIT Corporation

The New Jersey Transit Corporation was created by the New Jersey Legislature with the passing of the New Jersey Public Transportation Act of 1979. It was formed as “a public corporation[] for the purpose of converting New Jersey’s mass-transit system from one of private enterprise to one owned and operated by the State.” NJ TRANSIT is a department of the executive branch of the State, within, but independent of, the Department of Transportation (“NJDOT”). The Legislature declared that the purpose of NJ TRANSIT is to further the State’s goal of providing “efficient, coordinated, safe and responsive public transportation.” NJ TRANSIT is authorized to “[p]lan, design, construct, equip, operate, improve and maintain” commuter rail service on various rail lines throughout the State. NJ TRANSIT’s services cover “a service area of 5,325 square miles,” and “is the nation’s third largest provider of bus, rail and light rail transit,” including “165 rail stations, 62 light rail stations and more than 19,000 bus stops linking major points in New Jersey, New York and Philadelphia.” “NJ TRANSIT is the nation’s largest statewide public transportation system providing more than 895,000 weekday trips on 261 bus routes, three light rail lines, and 12 commuter rail lines and . . . Access Link paratransit service.” It “operates a fleet of 2,027 buses, 711 trains and 45 light rail vehicles,” which it uses to “provide nearly 223 million passenger trips each year.” NJ TRANSIT has approximately 11,700 employees and an annual budget in excess of $3 billion.

The powers of NJ TRANSIT are vested in an eight-member governing board. The board is made up of seven voting members: “the Commissioner of Transportation and the State Treasurer, who shall be members ex officio, another member of the Executive Branch to be
selected by the Governor who shall also serve ex-officio, and four other public members who shall be appointed by the Governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate.” The eighth member is a non-voting member, who “shall be appointed by the Governor upon the recommendation of the labor organization representing the plurality of the employees of the corporation.” The Chairman of the Board is the Commissioner of Transportation. NJ TRANSIT is “independent of any supervision or control by the [transportation] department or by any body or officer thereof.”

B. Overview of New Jersey Transit Police Department

Established on January 1, 1983, and governed by the Public Transportation Act of 1979, N.J.S.A. 27:25-1 to -24, the New Jersey Transit Police Department “is the only transit policing agency in the country with statewide authority and jurisdiction.” The NJTPD is a sworn law enforcement agency responsible for police and security protection of all NJ TRANSIT locations and services. Transit police officers “have general authority, without limitation, to exercise police powers and duties . . . in all criminal and traffic matters at all times throughout the State.” “The current, authorized strength of the [NJTPD] includes 220 sworn officers and 67 non-sworn members (which include Fare Enforcement Inspectors).”

C. Key NJ TRANSIT and NJTPD Personnel for Super Bowl XLVIII

Key officers and employees of NJ TRANSIT and the NJTPD at the time of the Super Bowl included James Simpson, James Weinstein, Kevin O’Connor, Joyce Gallagher, Richard Andreski, Chief Christopher Trucillo and Captain Patrick Clark.
Commissioner James S. Simpson - Commissioner of Department of Transportation and Chairman of NJ TRANSIT Board of Directors

James Simpson became Commissioner of the NJDOT in January 2010. He resigned from the post in June 2014. While Commissioner of the NJDOT, Commissioner Simpson also served as Chairman of the Boards for NJ TRANSIT, the New Jersey Turnpike Authority, the South Jersey Transportation Authority, and the Transportation Trust Fund Authority. As Commissioner, he was responsible for “overseeing a total of 17,000 employees, more than $3.6 billion in capital funds and over $2 billion in operating funds.”

Before his appointment as Commissioner of Transportation, Commissioner Simpson had vast public and private sector experience. In the private sector, he was “the chairman of both a transportation infrastructure management company and also a corporate relocation company.”

In the public sector, he served as Administrator of the Federal Transit Administration from 2005-2008, he briefly acted as the Senior Advisor to the U.S. Secretary of Transportation, and he also was appointed to the St. Lawrence Seaway Board at the U.S. Department of Transportation. In addition, Commissioner Simpson was appointed as a Commissioner of the New York State Metropolitan Transportation Authority, was a member of the New York State Job Development Authority, and was Honorary Deputy Police Commissioner for the New York Police Department.

After Commissioner Simpson’s resignation, on June 9, 2014, Joseph Bertoni was appointed Acting Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Transportation. He had previously served as NJDOT Deputy Commissioner.
James Weinstein - Executive Director

At the time of the Super Bowl, James Weinstein was the Executive Director of NJ TRANSIT. Weinstein was appointed as Executive Director in 2010. In that position, he was “responsible for the agency’s bus, light rail, and commuter rail network,” and overseeing the agency’s employees and capital and operating budgets.25

Before his appointment as Executive Director, “Weinstein served as senior vice president of AECOM, a global transportation consulting and engineering firm,” for approximately 8 years. He also previously served as senior vice president of Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor. From 1998 to 2002, Weinstein served as New Jersey Commissioner of Transportation and Chairman of the NJ TRANSIT Board of Directors.

Weinstein resigned as Executive Director on February 28, 2014, and was replaced by Veronique Hakim on March 3, 2014.26

Kevin O’Connor - Vice President & General Manager, Rail Operations

Kevin O’Connor was the Vice President and General Manager of NJ TRANSIT Rail Operations during the Super Bowl. He was appointed in 2011 and, in this role, was responsible for “managing a complex system of 12 commuter rail lines and 165 stations that serve more than 270,000 passenger trips on a typical weekday.”27 At the time of his appointment, O’Connor had more than thirty years of railroad operating experience. O’Connor’s employment with NJ TRANSIT ended on March 3, 2014.28 Shortly thereafter, he became Chief Transportation Officer of Metro-North Railroad, a division of the MTA that provides rail service in suburban New York and Connecticut.29
Joyce Gallagher - Vice President and General Manager, Bus Operations

At the time of the Super Bowl, Joyce Gallagher was employed by NJ TRANSIT as Vice President and General Manager, Bus Operations. With approximately thirty-seven years of transportation experience, she was appointed as the head of bus operations in 2012 after serving in an acting capacity since December 2011. She was responsible for “managing the second largest bus fleet in the nation, with buses serving approximately 65 percent of the State’s public transportation customers.”\(^{30}\) Gallagher’s employment with NJ TRANSIT ended on March 3, 2014.\(^{31}\)

Richard Andreski - Rail Operations Chief of Staff

For nearly four years, Richard Andreski has served as NJ TRANSIT Rail Operations Chief of Staff. He started his career with NJ TRANSIT fifteen years ago in an entry-level position. In connection with the Super Bowl, Andreski co-chaired the Transit Ambassador and Special Events Committees. He also served as NJ TRANSIT’s primary point person in coordinating with the NFL and NFL contractors on Super Bowl transit operations.

Chief Christopher Trucillo - NJTPD Chief

Christopher Trucillo has served as the Chief of the NJTPD since 2010. Before his appointment, Chief Trucillo “was the Director of Public Safety at John Jay College in New York City and an adjunct professor at Seton Hall University in the College of Education & Human Services Graduate Program.”\(^{32}\) He also served as “Chief of Police at the Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, where he was employed for 22 years.”\(^{33}\) During his time with the Port Authority, he served as Inspector/Commanding Officer for the Port Authority Bus Terminal and Newark Liberty International Airport.\(^{34}\)
Captain Patrick Clark - NJTPD Captain

Patrick Clark has held the position of NJTPD Captain since 2008.\textsuperscript{35} He served as NJTPD’s Incident Commander for the Super Bowl. As Incident Commander, he was in charge of all NJTPD Super Bowl-related personnel and activities, including coordination with other transportation service providers and law enforcement agencies.

D. Meadowlands Rail Station

The rail service link to the Meadowlands Sports Complex launched July 26, 2009, in time for the Gold Cup Final championship soccer match.\textsuperscript{36} The rail line operates between Hoboken Terminal, Secaucus Junction and Meadowlands Station for major Meadowlands events. The connection point to the Meadowlands is Secaucus Junction. Rail passengers who wish to travel to the Meadowlands from New York or other areas of New Jersey must make a connection at Secaucus Junction, or they may arrive there by other means of transportation and take the train directly from Secaucus Junction to Meadowlands Station. The Meadowlands line terminates at Meadowlands Station; it does not loop back to Secaucus Junction.
Trains operating between Meadowlands Station and Secaucus Junction must be staggered as trains travel both to and from Meadowlands Station using the same rail line. As a result, trains can operate, at best, on seven to eight minute headways. NJ TRANSIT has considered a loop between Secaucus Junction and Meadowlands Station. It requires extending the tracks over Route 3 and back to Secaucus Junction. This would increase capacity by allowing trains to depart on four to five minute headways. That project, however, is estimated to cost nearly $1 billion and is not being pursued by NJ TRANSIT.

NJ TRANSIT provides rail service for select events of 50,000 fans or more, which includes pre-season and regular season Giants and Jets games and certain major concerts and soccer matches. Originally designed to accommodate 10,000 passengers per hour, Meadowlands rail service provides “statewide rail access to the Meadowlands” Sports Complex, with Secaucus Junction providing the connection to “11 of 12 NJ TRANSIT rail lines,” including
a direct link to Hoboken Terminal. In anticipation of the Super Bowl, in 2013, NJ TRANSIT lengthened the lower platforms at Secaucus Junction, which had been designed and constructed to accommodate eight-car train sets, by 120 feet to provide service using ten-car train sets. This expansion allowed NJ TRANSIT to increase its service capacity to the Meadowlands, including the use of bi-level train cars, which have approximately twenty percent more capacity than single-level cars. NJ TRANSIT also expanded the number of bus slots from four to fourteen.

E. Secaucus Junction

The $450 million Frank R. Lautenberg Secaucus Junction Rail Station opened on December 15, 2003. The 312,000-square-foot station is built above the Main Line and Northeast Corridor in Secaucus, connecting trains on the Main, Bergen County, Pascack Valley, Port Jervis, Montclair-Boonton, Morristown, Gladstone, Northeast Corridor, North Jersey Coast and Raritan Valley lines. The map below shows the various rail lines connecting with Secaucus Junction.
The Secaucus station permits “NJ TRANSIT customers to reach many new destinations in New Jersey and the surrounding region, and shaves 10-15 minutes off of the travel time of North Jersey rail passengers traveling to midtown Manhattan.”

Secaucus Junction is a two-level station: The lower level serves Meadowlands/Hoboken trains; the upper level serves NEC/NY Penn Station trains, and the upper concourse provides customer amenities. All passengers from Hoboken changing trains must use escalators up to the upper concourse then down to their track level before boarding a Meadowlands bound train.
F. MetLife Stadium Loading Process for Regular Events

For events with an anticipated attendance of more than 50,000, NJ TRANSIT provides express service between Secaucus Junction and the Meadowlands, an approximately ten minute trip. Service typically begins three and a half hours before the start of the event, with departures every ten to twenty minutes. Trains run hourly during the event, and trains depart the Meadowlands approximately every ten minutes for at least one hour after the event.

During these events, Meadowlands Station and the surrounding area is staffed by members of the NJTPD, NJ TRANSIT operations, the NJSP, and the NJSEA. The personnel assigned normally have experience working Meadowlands Station events and are familiar with each other and the crowd control and loading process. Each organization maintains a well-defined operational responsibility at the station. The NJTPD is tasked with safety and crowd control on the train cars and track. The NJSP is charged with safety and crowd control on the platforms, while the NJSEA directs crowd queuing and the release of passengers onto the platform, where NJ TRANSIT personnel further guide the passengers. The NJ TRANSIT operations staff handles rail operations, including the order and timing of the platform/train loading and signaling the train crew to depart. We were told that the process has become so refined that the groups communicate with each other with simple hand gestures. We recognized the great pride they all took in moving passengers safely and efficiently.

NJ TRANSIT does not maintain a dedicated fleet for service to and from Meadowlands Station. Instead, they borrow train sets from other NJ TRANSIT rail lines. On a normal event day, trains are stacked on the three tracks at Meadowlands Station. Before the capital improvements, NJ TRANSIT deployed single-level, seven-car train sets, with a seated capacity
of approximately 800 passengers for each train set. Standing room increases capacity to approximately 1,000 passengers. Egress service normally moves eight trains per hour, with a typical hourly capacity of 6,000-8,000 passengers.

During the 2011-2013 NFL seasons, NJ TRANSIT rail service to the Meadowlands averaged 8,000 to 9,500 passengers per game. In that period, the highest football game volume was 12,500 passengers in 2012, and the lowest was 3,100 passengers for a 2013 pre-season game. Between 2012 and 2013, at non-NFL events, NJ TRANSIT averaged 6,675 passengers, with a high of approximately 12,600, and a low of approximately 2,500. Traditionally, NJ TRANSIT transports more passengers after the event than before.

During event egress, one train is loaded at a time for passenger safety and crowd control reasons. By not loading trains simultaneously, NJ TRANSIT can also better manage train loading to ensure that each train is loaded to capacity.

NJ TRANSIT personnel determine the order of trains to be loaded, and they direct passengers to the proper platform. Idle platforms are blocked by barricades until put to use. Passengers entering the platform are directed to the farthest end of the platform; trains load from the first car to the last to ensure that each car is loaded to capacity before the next car starts loading. Over time, NJ TRANSIT and the NJSEA developed a queuing and crowd control system. Crowd flow is controlled before the passengers reach the platforms by use of barriers to channel the crowd from the stadium area to Meadowlands Station. Using bicycle gates on one side and the fence that separates Platform 1 from the stadium area on the other, a winding, u-shaped path directs passengers to the platforms.
Before peak egress, passengers free flow through the path until they reach NJ TRANSIT personnel, who direct them to the particular platform for loading. NJ TRANSIT personnel are present at the entrance to each of the three platforms, the only access point to the platforms. They manually count passengers entering onto the platform to ensure the trains are properly loaded. NJ TRANSIT told us it validated the manual counts from video of prior events. The manual counts and video counts were within five to ten percent of each other. Once a train is fully loaded, NJ TRANSIT staff closes that platform, diverting the incoming passengers to the next platform/train where the process begins anew.

As passengers leave an event, two bicycle gates are opened to allow free flow to the platform loading area. An NJSEA on-site manager in the large open area near the end of the path monitors the crowd flow. The NJSEA manager has visual and radio contact with NJ
TRANSIT personnel responsible for rail operations. Free flow ends when the crowd starts to build. In coordination with NJ TRANSIT, the NJSEA manager determines when queuing should begin based on visual observation of the crowd volume, the time remaining in the event, and the score of the game, if applicable. When they make the decision to start the queuing process, the direct access bicycle gates are closed, and passengers are redirected to the u-shaped path.

As the queuing process begins, NJSEA staff uses a rope line to close off the exit from the u-shaped path to the platform loading area. This begins use of the open rectangular space at the end of the u-shaped path as a holding pen for approximately 800 passengers, i.e., one train load of passengers. NJSEA staff direct passengers into this pen until it is full. Once full, NJSEA staff use a second rope line at the entrance to the pen to close off access to that area, creating a group of approximately 800 passengers or one train load. Once the pen is cleared, the next group of passengers fills the holding pen. The process continues until the crowd dissipates and it is safe for the remaining passengers to once again free flow onto the platforms.
The use of approximately 800 person pens permits NJ TRANSIT and NJSEA to move passengers quickly and efficiently onto the trains. Passengers wait approximately fifteen abreast. Once the rope line is lifted, passengers can swiftly access the platform and board the waiting train. We were informed that in cases where a variation in the equipment used by NJ TRANSIT increases capacity of a train set beyond approximately 800 passengers, NJ TRANSIT directs NJSEA to release additional passengers from the pen to reach the increased capacity of a particular train set.
During the years that the Meadowlands Station has been in operation, NJ TRANSIT reported that no serious passenger safety issues have occurred, and, other than occasional shoving, passengers have conducted themselves appropriately during the queuing, penning, and loading process. Based on our interviews, video review of a typical event, and an analysis of loading data, we found the process to be logical, efficient, safe, and orderly.

G. U2 Concerts

NJ TRANSIT experienced its first unexpected crowd surge onto the Meadowlands rail link shortly after the initiation of the service. The world-renowned band U2 has been selling out stadiums and arenas for more than twenty years. 2009 was no exception when they sold out Giants Stadium for two mid-week, evening concerts on September 23 and 24. The concerts drew approximately 80,000 fans each night. Those numbers were not unusual for the Stadium. What was unusual was that about 20,000 fans availed themselves of the rail service from Secaucus Junction to the Stadium each night, breaking all previous passenger records. Before U2, no more than 7,000 fans used the rail service to the Stadium for events. At the time of the concerts, the Secaucus Junction platforms had yet to be expanded from its eight-car capacity, and no bi-level trains were in use. Those capital improvements came just before Super Bowl XLVIII.

On U2’s first night, Secaucus Junction was inundated with this unexpected crowd. Staggered arrivals lessened the delays upon ingress, but there were still significant delays. At Secaucus Junction, hundreds of people waited to buy tickets or to board the trains. Passengers complained that there were no instructions, no announcements and minimal security, leaving passengers to guess from which platform the next train would be leaving. If they guessed wrong,
they could not escape the crush of the crowd, forcing them to wait up to an hour for three or four trains to pass before they could find standing room to board one.\textsuperscript{49} The trains were reportedly jam-packed, leaving Secaucus for the Stadium at crush capacity. There were unconfirmed reports of passengers falling into the gap between the train and the platform and being pulled back up by fellow passengers. No bus service was offered.\textsuperscript{50}

Upon egress, concertgoers experienced longer delays. As the concert ended, approximately 20,000 people headed \textit{en masse} to Meadowlands Station.\textsuperscript{51} Concertgoers reported two-hour delays just to board the trains, even with trains running every eight to ten minutes.\textsuperscript{52} Although the show had been sold out in advance, and officials were aware that approximately 80,000 people would attend the concert, it appears that NJ TRANSIT had no advance indication that 20,000 fans would take the train to the Stadium.

In preparation for the second night of 80,000 concertgoers, NJ TRANSIT began a media blitz urging concertgoers to: buy tickets at their origin station (rather than waiting to purchase them in Secaucus), buy a round-trip ticket in advance, consider travel from Hoboken (which offers direct service to Meadowlands Station with a stop at Secaucus Junction) and arrive as early as possible.\textsuperscript{53} For the second night, NJ TRANSIT added additional staff and cash-only ticket windows at NY Penn Station to process passengers faster. NJ TRANSIT maximized rail cars wherever possible.\textsuperscript{54}

NJ TRANSIT estimated that ridership to the Stadium increased to 21,000 riders on the second night. The media blitz worked so well in directing customers to purchase tickets at NY Penn Station that to relieve Penn Station’s overcrowding, customers were redirected to purchase tickets at Secaucus Junction, creating ticket lines of twenty to thirty deep. But it was the
implementation of extra shuttle equipment “short turning” that helped move people to the stadium that “seemed to save the day.”

“Turning” is a reference to changing the operation direction of a train, whereas ”short turning” refers to reversing the direction of travel before the train reaches the last station or terminal. For events at the Stadium, trains operated between Hoboken Terminal and Meadowlands Station with an intermediate stop at Secaucus Junction. NJ TRANSIT found the Hoboken service did not carry many customers and began to “short turn” trains at Secaucus Junction rather than send these trains to Hoboken, increasing service between Secaucus Junction and the Stadium without additional train sets or crews. The changes NJ TRANSIT made between the first and second nights improved efficiency, but NJ TRANSIT was still limited by its then capacity of 10,000 passengers per hour.

On the heels of the U2 concerts, Bruce Springsteen began a five-night run at the Stadium between September 29 and October 9, 2009. NJ TRANSIT switched tactics, reinstituting bus service and encouraging people to use other transportation. It tweaked service by “adding crews and trains and dedicating two tracks at Secaucus Junction for Meadowlands-bound trains.” It had “six ticket offices on the North Jersey Coast Line remain open later for concertgoers.” It “open[ed] cash-only lines at Penn Station New York.” “Rail cars [were] added to increase capacity, and trains [ran] on a “load-and-go” basis after the show and close to the shows’ start times.” “Load-and-go” was implemented on the bus run between the Stadium and the Port Authority Bus Terminal after the show. NJ TRANSIT was learning first-hand how to serve record numbers of riders.

Within about five minutes, the people who got off a Northeast corridor train were on board a shuttle train that would have them at Giant’s Stadium in 10 minutes.
Making that happen was a small army of people, from volunteers . . . to train crews with the mission of seeing that trains taking Springsteen fans to the concert at Giant’s Stadium were born to run.  

All these actions presaged some of the steps to be instituted for the Super Bowl.

The Springsteen shows, although the crowds were smaller, were “a challenge because concertgoers [were] coming from all directions,” whereas approximately ninety-five percent of the U2 concertgoers came from New York.  

NJ TRANSIT officials parked an extra train set at one of the two platforms at Secaucus, “ready to be loaded if the platform got too crowded with concertgoers.” For train riders, the Springsteen concert was “smooth – a big improvement over the U2 concerts” a week earlier.

NJ TRANSIT “released ridership figures for the first 19 Giants Stadium events at which football fans and concert-goers had the option of riding the train to the Meadowlands.” According to those figures, “more than 20,000 fans used the train for each of the two U2 concerts . . . [but] only about 20 to 30 percent [4,000 to 6,000] as many people rode the rails to catch any of the five Bruce Springsteen concerts.”

IV. FINDINGS OF FACT

A. NJ/NY is Awarded Super Bowl XLVIII

On May 25, 2010, the NFL awarded Super Bowl XLVIII to New Jersey/New York. After four rounds of voting, a majority of the NFL’s thirty-two owners voted in favor of holding the February 2014 game in the new Meadowlands Stadium (later named MetLife Stadium). For NJ/NY to be eligible to host the Super Bowl, the NFL waived, on a one-time basis, its weather requirement of a domed stadium or fifty degree minimum average temperature for open-air stadiums. NJ/NY was selected over competing bids from South Florida and Tampa Bay.70

In many ways, this was to be a Super Bowl of firsts. It was the NFL’s first northeastern Super Bowl. It was the NFL’s first outdoor, cold-weather Super Bowl. It was the first bi-state Super Bowl. It was the first Super Bowl co-hosted by two NFL franchises. And, it was dubbed, the first “Mass Transit” Super Bowl. Indeed, the NJ/NY bid presentation promoted the convenience of public transportation and ease of access from New York City to the game site.71 Because of all these firsts, according to the NFL, Super Bowl XLVIII had the longest planning lead-up of any Super Bowl.

B. Super Bowl Preparations

1. General

More than just a football game, the Super Bowl was a week of festivities that was expected to attract approximately 400,000 visitors to the New Jersey/New York region.72 Events included a Super Bowl Kickoff public concert and fireworks display in Jersey City, Media Day in Newark, an Opening Ceremony and Super Bowl Boulevard in Manhattan, and lavish Super
Bowl parties and VIP events throughout the entire week. To support these Super Bowl activities and accommodate the influx of visitors, while still servicing its everyday customers, NJ TRANSIT began preparing in earnest for the Super Bowl in September 2011—almost two and a half years before the game.

NJ TRANSIT served as the lead transportation agency for Super Bowl XLVIII. To cover its diverse responsibilities, NJ TRANSIT assembled working groups of approximately fifty employees in the following areas: (1) Fares, (2) Finance, (3) Ambassadors and Employee Outreach, (4) Events, (5) Service Planning, (6) Media Relations, (7) Customer Communications, (8) Social Media, (9) Marketing, (10) Capital Projects, and (11) Technology. These teams worked on fifty-five specific tasks, including station management and customer way-finding programs for NY Penn Station, Secaucus Junction, Newark Penn Station and Hoboken Station, technology investments, employee/ambassador training, the preparation of a comprehensive operations playbook and risk register, and a bus operations playbook. The working groups met approximately once a month. Smaller sub-groups held additional meetings on an as-needed basis for specific tasks.

For “technical assistance” with this work, NJ TRANSIT engaged a consultant, AECOM Technical Services, Inc. AECOM was retained to help with the “preparation of a comprehensive plan for transit services that will ensure a seamless travel experience for both visitors and regular commuters during Super Bowl 48 week;” “organizing a peer review of the plan with national and international experts;” “maintain[ing] a risk register and corresponding contingencies;” and “facilitat[ing] tabletop and field exercises to test the plan elements.”
AECOM attended meetings with the NFL and NFL contractors and provided feedback on Super Bowl rail ridership projections.

As part of its planning efforts, NJ TRANSIT and NJTPD sent staff to Indianapolis (2012) and New Orleans (2013) to observe Super Bowl transportation and security measures. This enabled NJ TRANSIT to observe traffic and crowd control and meet with transportation planners in both host cities. It also was able to evaluate first-hand the demands placed on public transportation by Super Bowl-week events, such as the need for road closures and bus detour routes. In Indianapolis, it picked up tips on weather preparedness. In New Orleans, AECOM collected detailed data on guest arrival times, which were used in planning activities. In both locations, NJ TRANSIT observed how the heightened security standards of the Super Bowl impacted public transportation and the area surrounding the stadium.

NJ TRANSIT, with AECOM, also hosted a two-day peer review session in May 2013. The peer review team consisted of individuals who organized transportation for large events, such as the Olympic Games, past Super Bowls, and the 2012 Democratic National Convention. The peer review team provided feedback on “key lessons learned” from their experiences, identified “gaps in the preliminary transportation plan” and “main risks for transport services.”

The preliminary transportation plan reviewed during this process was a detailed 100 page document covering NJ TRANSIT’s rail and bus service plans, necessary coordination with other regional transportation providers, highway operations planning, parking and terminals issues, and contingency planning.

In addition, NJ TRANSIT spearheaded a regional transportation working group. Regional coordination was essential due to the anticipated needs of guests and commuters.
traveling across multiple transit systems. In sum, Super Bowl travel impacted at least eight transportation agencies, as guests and events were spread out across both sides of the Hudson River. The regional working group included representatives from NJ TRANSIT, New York City Transit, Long Island Railroad, Metro North Railroad, Port Authority of NY & NJ, PATH, Amtrak, NY Waterway, U.S. Coast Guard, and private bus carriers. A regional transportation summit on August 22, 2012, kicked off these coordinated efforts. The summit identified Super Bowl week challenges, including “increased demand on already constrained transit systems, different systems with unique technical criteria and labor agreements, potential mechanical and infrastructure failures, weather, safety & security.” Among other things, the group considered a common ticket for use across all New York and New Jersey public transportation systems, but that plan was found to be too complicated to be implemented.

Safety and security elements permeated most aspects of the planning effort. As a high profile “event of national significance,” the United States Department of Homeland Security classifies the Super Bowl as a SEAR-I event (Special Event Assessment Rating I). The SEAR System quantifies risk factors to determine the event’s potential attractiveness as a terrorist target, and, based on the classification, the Federal government may deploy assets to work alongside state and local resources for security and incident management preparedness. Under this system, events are tiered from I through V, with level I having the greatest potential to be targeted. Only National Special Security Events, such as presidential inaugurations, State of the Union addresses, and the two quadrennial political conventions have a higher security designation than the Super Bowl. Public transportation service and planning needed to comport with this heightened level of security. As part of its security planning, the NJTPD
Office of Emergency Management developed a comprehensive incident action plan, providing the framework for the NJTPD’s safety and security operations throughout Super Bowl week.

2. **Transit Operations Super Bowl XLVIII Playbook**

NJ TRANSIT’s planning activities were documented in a detailed operations playbook. The Playbook is a comprehensive 158 page document with a 216 page annex. The Playbook summarizes NJ TRANSIT’s transportation plan for Super Bowl week and served as a reference document for internal managers and key external partners. Security related matters were not addressed in the Playbook. Those were covered instead in the NJTPD’s incident action plan and are outside the scope of this report.

Among its key parts, the Playbook included: a description of Super Bowl events and associated travel demand estimates; a strategic overview of NJ TRANSIT’s baseline transportation plan for the Super Bowl week; a daily summary of NJ TRANSIT service plans for rail, bus, light rail and Access Link; and key conditions and locations to be monitored to identify potential issues early, allowing for a more timely activation of contingencies, if necessary.

a. **Passenger Travel Demand**

NJ TRANSIT designed its Playbook based on the following passenger estimates:

- 42,000 guests/media to be served by NFL, the Host Committee and SP+ Gameday;
- 22,800 guests to travel by personal autos or hired cars;
- 12,000 guests to be served by NJ TRANSIT Rail to Meadowlands Station;
- Twenty-five to thirty percent of guests to attend on-site, pre-game parties and events spreading arrivals and reducing peak passenger volumes.
b. **NJ TRANSIT Planned Objectives**

The Playbook outlined NJ TRANSIT’s Super Bowl service goals. Those goals, based on an expectation of approximately 12,000 Super Bowl rail passengers, included:

**NJ TRANSIT Core Goals:**

- To maximize safety of everyday customers and guests.
- To provide seamless and convenient travel experience for everyday customers and guests.
- To provide appropriate contingencies for weather, infrastructure and equipment issues, as well as unplanned events.

**Rail service objectives:**

- To provide safe and efficient service for guests using NJ TRANSIT rail on Super Bowl Sunday.
- To provide safe, comfortable, seamless, and timely service to guests throughout Super Bowl week.
- After the game, to clear the majority of rail passengers in sixty to ninety minutes following the awards ceremony.
- To provide connections between all major origin stations and the Meadowlands.
- To maintain a normal level of service for non-event NJ TRANSIT passengers during Super Bowl week.
- To provide connections to adjacent rail systems.
- To develop risk management strategies related to weather, passenger demand variations, incidents, and infrastructure/equipment issues.

**Secaucus Junction Service Objectives:**

- Support the safe and smooth movement of passengers through the station as they move from their arrival level to their departure level.
- Manage passenger queuing in the upper concourse and platform areas, to insure that waiting passengers are properly directed and informed as/if they encounter delays.
- Provide way-finding, signage, and ambassador support to guests to inform them as they move through the station.
c. **Capital and Technology Improvement Plan**

NJ TRANSIT implemented a capital and technology improvement plan to address the needs of the Super Bowl and future growth. The Plan included the following projects:

- Improved station signage;
- Installed trailer at west end of Meadowlands Station;
- Implemented NICE Vision passenger counting;
- Extended Secaucus Junction platforms;
- Performed IT Upgrades;
- Installed/upgraded WiFi at terminals;
- Upgraded network bandwidth;
- Installed cameras to view Meadowlands Station; and
- Accelerated mobile ticketing.  

d. **Risk Register**

The Playbook included a Risk Register, which identified risks that could impact NJ TRANSIT’s ability to meet its Super Bowl objectives. The risk categories included: labor, weather, demand variation, rail or bus infrastructure and service, highway incidents, programmatic elements, and capital and technology projects. There were thirteen identified risks associated with unpredicted demand variation, including three of high impact (passenger demand variation, passenger service capability and Thursday-Saturday Super Bowl Boulevard event attendees). Mitigation strategies for these demand related risks included (i) evaluating options to maximize passenger service rates and throughput, (ii) establishing crowd management protocols at key transit facilities like Meadowlands Station and Secaucus Junction, (iii) determining appropriate thresholds at which additional trains in reserve are added to service, and (iv) determining appropriate thresholds at which guidance to transfer to alternate travel modes should be related to customers.
e. **NJ TRANSIT Memo re: Service Contingencies**

In a memo dated January 16, 2014, James Weinstein, then executive director of NJ TRANSIT, wrote to Wayne Hasenbalg, NJSEA President, and Al Kelly, NY/NJ Super Bowl Host Committee, to address NJ TRANSIT Service Contingencies for Super Bowl XLVIII. The memo covered NJ TRANSIT’s preparation for the Super Bowl and anticipated challenges and risks. The top risk categories were identified as 1) changing game start time or date; 2) inclement weather; 3) greatly increased ridership; 4) infrastructure failures; and 5) labor shortfalls.95

As to the risk of greatly increased ridership, the memo noted that the Host Committee and the NFL advised NJ TRANSIT that approximately 12,000 guests would use NJ TRANSIT trains to travel to the game. To accommodate the expected crowd, NJ TRANSIT planned to deploy every available rail set to provide service every ten minutes or better to and from the Stadium. This would allow NJ TRANSIT to operate at its system capacity of approximately 12,000-13,000 passengers per hour. In case of rail disruption, NJ TRANSIT had up to 300 buses on standby in northern New Jersey for Super Bowl Sunday. The memo stated in underlined print: “Except for the above-mentioned buses, NJ TRANSIT has no other available options to increase service. If ridership greatly exceeds the estimated 12,000 people, guests will experience extended wait times for service.”96

3. **Entities Involved in Planning and Implementation of NJ TRANSIT’s Super Bowl Service**

While NJ TRANSIT assumed the lead for its Super Bowl service, several other organizations played an important part in the implementation and/or planning of these services. In broad strokes, NJ TRANSIT periodically participated in meetings and discussions with the
NFL, its contractors, and the Host Committee regarding transportation issues. These discussions covered such topics as train ridership expectations, the egress queuing system and related chain of command, the set-up of Welcome Pavilion 6 (“Pavilion 6”), which would process fans before and after the game, bus contingency options, and accommodations at the sports complex in the event emergency bus service became necessary. Preparations also included multiple site visits, a bus tour, and a final walk-through in the days leading up to the Super Bowl.

a. **NFL**

The Super Bowl is the NFL’s annual championship game pitting the NFC champions against the AFC champions. The first Super Bowl was held on January 15, 1967, in Los Angeles, California between the Green Bay Packers and Kansas City Chiefs. The NFL oversees and coordinates most aspects of the game. As it relates to this report, the NFL retained a variety of contractors that played a part in the planning and implementation of transit services. The NFL also placed a pavilion captain inside Pavilion 6 and had a representative participate in transit meetings with NJ TRANSIT and the NFL transportation consultants.

b. **SP+ Gameday**

SP+ Gameday served as the NFL’s transportation management consultant for the Super Bowl. SP+ Gameday has served in this role since 1999. It also had site specific experience with MetLife Stadium as it managed shuttle bus services for the Giants and Jets from 2007 to 2010. For Super Bowl XLVIII, SP+ Gameday’s services included developing a detailed transportation master plan, managing parking passes, the NFL Fan Express bus service, shuttle services, and team transports. Throughout the Super Bowl planning process, SP+ Gameday shared its train ridership estimates with NJ TRANSIT.
c. S.A.F.E. Management

The NFL retained S.A.F.E. Management ("S.A.F.E.") for pre-event, game-day and post-event security services. S.A.F.E. has been performing Super Bowl-related security services since 2006. For Super Bowl XLVIII, S.A.F.E. managed approximately 2,500 red-jacketed security personnel. Of significance to NJ TRANSIT’s services, S.A.F.E. provided security services in the area surrounding the train platform, including inside Pavilion 6.

d. Populous Holdings, Inc.

Populous Holdings, Inc. ("Populous") served as the architect of the Super Bowl campus. "For nearly 30 consecutive years Populous has been the coordinating firm responsible for stadium remodeling, necessary additions, temporary facilities, operations planning and management for the entire Super Bowl campus." Populous developed facilities plans and blueprints for the campus layout. Populous also had one of its gray-jacketed representatives stationed inside Pavilion 6.

e. Party Planners West, Inc.

Party Planners West, Inc. ("PPW") was retained by the NFL as an event planner. As part of its duties, PPW worked on the design and construction of the welcome pavilions. PPW also participated in the development of the ingress and egress process for train riders entering and leaving through the welcome pavilions.

f. New Jersey Sports & Exposition Authority

In 1971, the State Legislature established the New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority ("NJSEA") to build and operate the Meadowlands Sports Complex. Having managed the Sports Complex, parking areas and related security since construction, NJSEA has
extensive institutional knowledge of the facility, train station operations and crowd flow. For the Super Bowl, NJSEA supplied approximately 700 yellow-jacketed security guards who supported S.A.F.E.

g. New Jersey State Police

As a SEAR-1 event, the NJSP had a substantial safety and security role for the Super Bowl. On Super Bowl Sunday, an increased cadre of 700 State Troopers worked the Super Bowl. Usually, 160 State Troopers work a normal event. The bulk of the NJSP’s extensive Super Bowl duties falls outside the scope of our review. As it relates to this report, the NJSP had no planned role in loading and unloading train or bus passengers. Instead, it was asked to provide a safety and security presence on the train platform and inside Welcome Pavilion 6 and the surrounding area. As discussed in more detail later, the NJSP assumed a more active role in the egress process than anticipated in order to address certain perceived safety concerns.

h. 2014 NY/NJ Super Bowl Host Committee

The NY/NJ Super Bowl Host Committee was tasked with a diverse range of responsibilities, including fulfilling the region’s Super Bowl bid requirements, raising approximately $70 million to support the game and related events, coordinating activities, logistics and transportation issues, and managing approximately 9,000 hospitality volunteers.

C. Super Bowl Transportation Options

Fans attending Super Bowl XLVIII had three principle means of transportation to MetLife Stadium: 1) car/vehicle for hire, 2) Fan Express Bus or 3) train. Unlike venues in other Super Bowl host cities, due to the location of MetLife Stadium, fans were unable to walk to the
game. Therefore, some mode of transportation was necessary for each person attending the game, including event workers.

1. **Driving to MetLife Stadium**

Under normal conditions, MetLife Stadium has approximately 26,115 parking spaces available. For Super Bowl XLVIII, there were only about 11,308 spaces designated for parking. The reduction in the number of available parking spaces was due to a number of factors based on the overall campus design layout for Super Bowl Sunday. As a SEAR-I security event, the usual 100-foot security perimeter around MetLife Stadium was increased to a 300-foot perimeter, resulting in a reduction of available parking spaces. Other normally available parking areas were occupied by facilities for NFL operations, media and broadcast affiliates, and sundry on-site game-day operations. The remaining parking spaces were allocated based on the mode of transportation—one space per passenger vehicles, five to six spaces per bus, and two to three spaces per limousine. All vehicles carrying passengers to the game required a valid parking permit.

Each type of parking pass had a different price point. Car/SUV/Van passes were $150. Limousine passes were $200. Minibus passes were $250, and bus passes were $350. The parking passes were not sold in connection with game tickets. Online sales of parking passes started December 12, 2013 at https://superbowl.clickandpark.com. The NFL advised that it deliberately held back parking pass sales until December to limit resale opportunities. It also advised all parking pass orders were scrutinized; it did not fill orders that appeared suspicious. Yet, despite these policies, resellers reportedly obtained car parking passes and resold them in the secondary market for $257 or more.
Upon arrival at MetLife Stadium, vehicles were subject to restrictions. Tailgating was curtailed. Coolers, food, and drinks were permitted, but grills were prohibited. Fans were permitted to eat or drink in or next to their cars so long as those activities were confined to the single allocated parking space. Similar rules were in place in previous Super Bowls. Once vehicles for hire, like charter buses or limousines, transported fans to the game at MetLife Stadium, they could not leave until game end. Drop-offs at MetLife Stadium were prohibited.

2. Fan Express Bus Service

On Super Bowl Sunday, the NFL sponsored “The Fan Express” bus service to the Super Bowl, costing $51 per person. The service had nine pick-up locations in New York and New Jersey. Service was provided from:

Battery Place
20 Battery Place
New York, NY 10004

6th Ave & Minetta Lane
On 6th Ave between Minetta Lane
and 4th St – East curb

Madison Square Park
On Madison Ave between 25th St
And 26th St – East curb

Grand Central Terminal
On 45th St between
Vanderbilt Ave & Lexington Ave

Waldorf Astoria
On Lexington Ave between 50th St
and 51st St – West curb
Time Warner Center  
On 9th Ave between 58th St and 60th St – West curb

The Plaza at Harmon Meadow  
500 Plaza Drive  
Secaucus, NJ 07094

Newark Liberty International Airport Marriott  
1 Hotel Rd  
Newark, NJ 07114

Hanover Marriott  
1401 New Jersey 10  
East Hanover, NJ 07981

Fan Express tickets had strict rules: a specific departure location, a specific boarding/departure time, and a specific assigned bus number. Tickets were not transferable for other buses or times. Buses departed each location “every half hour between 1:30 p.m. and 4:30 p.m.” These specifications applied to post-game departure as well. Buses departed after the end of the game, with the final bus departing one hour after the Lombardi Trophy presentation. In order to expedite Fan Express service to and from New York City, one lane of the Lincoln Tunnel was designated an express lane for their use.

3. **Train**

By far, the least expensive transportation option to the Super Bowl was NJ TRANSIT rail service from Secaucus Junction to Meadowlands Station. It was also the only unreserved option open to all ticketholders. NJ TRANSIT designated ten-car, bi-level train sets for exclusive use between Secaucus Junction and Meadowlands Station on Super Bowl Sunday. Each train’s
capacity was approximately 1,350 seated passengers. The trains were to run from Secaucus Junction to the Stadium every ten to fifteen minutes beginning at 1:41 p.m. and post-game from the Stadium to Secaucus Junction every eight to ten minutes or on a load-and-go basis.

NJ TRANSIT offered various ticketing options. Rail tickets for the Super Bowl could be purchased online, at ticket vending machines located at all rail stations and bus terminals, at ticket offices at major stations and terminals, or through NJ TRANSIT’s mobile tickets app, called My Tix. Ticket options included one-way tickets and round-trip tickets. Senior citizen and customers with disabilities fares were available for a reduced price of half the regular one-way fare. Children’s fares were provided at fifty percent savings for children five to eleven, and up to three children under the age of four were permitted to ride free with a passenger paying a valid fare. A family super saver fare also was available, allowing up to two children between the ages of five to eleven to ride for free with a passenger paying a valid fare.

The price of a round-trip rail ticket to Meadowlands Station was $10.50. NJ TRANSIT offered a $50 “Super Pass,” valid for an unlimited number of rides on all modes of NJ TRANSIT transportation during Super Bowl week. NJ TRANSIT sold the Super Pass at ticket vending machines, through My Tix, or at NY Penn Station, Port Authority Bus Terminal, Newark Penn Station, or Hoboken Terminal, where customers also could purchase a commemorative, limited edition pass. It turns out that local commuters purchased most of the Super Passes because it was less expensive than the cost of normal weekly commuting. Aware of this practice, NJ TRANSIT understood that only a portion of Super Pass purchasers would attend the game.

Fans were encouraged to use mass transit to the “first mass transit Super Bowl.” The NFL’s Super Bowl XLVIII website answered the question of how best to get to MetLife...
Stadium: “Though driving is an option, we STRONGLY encourage all fans to take mass transit to MetLife Stadium on Super Bowl Sunday. . . . The best way to get to MetLife Stadium on Super Bowl Sunday is to take the Fan Express bus or the train.”¹¹³ (emphasis in original).

4. **Train Ridership Projections**

Throughout the planning process, SP+ Gameday provided estimates of the number of projected rail passengers for Super Bowl Sunday. Initially, SP+ Gameday, in May 2013, estimated that 10,000 fans would ride the train to MetLife Stadium. SP+ Gameday based its initial estimates on historic ridership data supplied by NJ TRANSIT for prior NFL games. Comparisons to other Super Bowls were futile because of the uniqueness of the event and the uniqueness of the venue—a non-urban, relatively isolated location having a central mass-transit component but no walk-up access.

SP+ Gameday periodically updated the estimates as the planning progressed, but the figures remained in the same general range as the initial projection. In October 2013, SP+ Gameday still projected 10,000 rail passengers. It then raised the estimate slightly, on November 19, 2013, to 12,000 expected riders.

The projections became more frequent as the Super Bowl approached. On December 20, 2013, Mike Witte of SP+ Gameday wrote to Rich Andreski of NJ TRANSIT that “it’s looking real good that we’ll have 65,000+ fans parked on-site. That’s not counting the Fan Express Bus Program with a targeted ridership of 7,000+ fans.” As backup for these numbers, Witte offered to send NJ TRANSIT a report tracking “[a]ctual parking spaces sold,” “[p]rojected parking spaces sold or allocated,” “remaining parking inventory/spaces for sale,” and “Fan Express Bus Program ridership sales.”¹¹⁴ Andreski responded on December 23, 2013, that the “report will be
invaluable as we try to anticipate the number of guests who will use the train on Super Bowl Sunday.” Andreski also found the projected “numbers . . . encouraging.”115

On January 6, 2014, SP+ Gameday circulated a parking pass and Fan Express sales report to representatives of NJ TRANSIT, the NFL, the Host Committee, Populous, S.A.F.E. Management, and Party Planners West, among others. Based on the sales data, the report projected 10,828 train riders.116

During the week leading to the Super Bowl, SP+ Gameday updated the report and its train ridership estimates daily to reflect actual sales data.117 Using the sales figures, SP+ Gameday estimated the total number of fans who would arrive via each type of vehicular transportation. These calculations applied a “load factor” to each type of purchased parking pass. The load factor was the estimated average number of people per vehicle.

The total number of passengers traveling by each vehicle type was then estimated by multiplying the load factor by the number of permits sold in each category. The totals for each category were then added to reach a total number of fans who would arrive by vehicular transportation. Based on an expected attendance of 80,000 fans at the Super Bowl, the estimated number of fans to arrive by rail was calculated by subtracting the total number of vehicular passengers from the total expected attendance. In its final estimate, SP+ Gameday projected 8,572 rail passengers. SP+ Gameday considered the load factors it used to be conservative, for example, using a load factor of forty passengers per bus rather than a full bus load of fifty-five passengers.
The below table reflects SP+ Gameday’s final January 31, 2014 projection:\(^{118}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SP+ Gameday Estimated Pre-Game Transportation to MetLife Stadium</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Super Bowl XLVIII Attendance 80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cars/Vans/SUVs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFL &amp; Private Charter Buses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limousines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minibuses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBHC Fan Express Bus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NJ TRANSIT Rail Passengers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NJ TRANSIT did not rely exclusively on the SP+ Gameday’s estimates. AECOM, the transportation and consulting firm retained by NJ TRANSIT, performed its own estimates. In its “first pass,” AECOM estimated that “the rail passenger demand could be as high as 32,000 persons, as compared to typical rail capacity of 15-20,000.”\(^{119}\) AECOM acknowledged that there is “[l]ots of room to debate the numbers, but it does indicate that it may be important to carefully manage who and how many can show up and ride rail.”\(^{120}\) The author of that prescient estimate, Gary Davies, described this early effort as a quick calculation without insight into necessary hotel or bus permit data, instead relying on a population and demographics review with an expectation that a high number of game attendees would be traveling to the game from New York—not New Jersey.

AECOM indicated that, throughout the planning process, it believed the rail number would be double the estimates provided by SP+ Gameday and the NFL. In an August 12, 2013 email, AECOM expressed concern over the transportation calculations provided by SP+
Gameday, indicating that it believed nearly 14,000 fans had not been accounted for by SP+ Gameday.\textsuperscript{121} Based on the data provided by SP+ Gameday, AECOM estimated that “the real working number for rail should be at least 17,000” passengers.\textsuperscript{122} In December 2013, AECOM provided NJ TRANSIT with a rail demand and queuing analysis memorandum. At that time, AECOM indicated that the number still pointed to 17,000 possible rail passengers. It also indicated that it did not believe Pavilion 6 had the capacity to process the peak ingress passengers. AECOM recommended that a plan be developed to reroute passengers, as necessary, to another security checkpoint in order to reduce wait times and prevent passenger lines from backing up onto the platforms.\textsuperscript{123}

NJ TRANSIT also examined SP+ Gameday’s final sales data and reached its own conclusions. Applying a more conservative load factor, NJ TRANSIT arrived at a slightly higher estimate of 12,965 rail passengers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimated Super Bowl XLVIII Attendance 80,000</th>
<th>Actual Permits Sold</th>
<th>Estimated Load Factor</th>
<th>Estimated Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cars/Vans/SUVs</td>
<td>5,591</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>13,978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFL &amp; Private Charter Buses</td>
<td>1,083</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>43,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limousines</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>1,848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minibuses</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>2,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBHC Fan Express Bus</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>5,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>7,280</td>
<td></td>
<td>67,036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NJ TRANSIT Rail Passengers</td>
<td></td>
<td>80,000-67,036</td>
<td>12,965 NJT Rail</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the ridership estimates, for two weeks leading up to the Super Bowl, NJ TRANSIT had advance rail ticket sales data. This data indicated that before Super Bowl
Sunday, approximately 11,100 rail tickets had been purchased. By 11:00 a.m. on Super Bowl Sunday, based on the advance sales and walk-up sales to that point in the morning, NJ TRANSIT estimated that rail ridership would be approximately 13,500.\textsuperscript{125} The final ticket sales data shows that walk-up game day sales amounted to approximately 21,500 additional tickets.\textsuperscript{126}

D. Super Bowl Campus

Populous, a sports architecture and special event planning firm working with the NFL on Super Bowls since 1985, prepared the game day facilities plan ("Facilities Plan").\textsuperscript{127} The "Facilities Plan included the overall site layout of the Meadowlands Sports Complex for Super Bowl Sunday and the MetLife Stadium interior layout for NFL and other game-day operations. The site plans included parking lot designations, the locations of the various guest services, the locations of NFL and broadcast facilities, pre-event party locations, and security provisions. Several of the layout and planning considerations involved security concerns that came with the heightened security levels for the Super Bowl.

The Super Bowl campus at MetLife Stadium was designed with a hard security perimeter, which included fences and concrete barriers.\textsuperscript{128} Access inside the secured perimeter was strictly limited to NFL credentialed individuals, including employees working the event, ticketed fans and law enforcement with public safety credentials. The perimeter was designed to be a minimum of 300 feet from the Stadium, with the exception of the adjacent NJ TRANSIT rail line and station. The security perimeter was decreased to exclude the Meadowlands rail line and station to ensure that NJ TRANSIT trains and fans arriving by train were outside the security perimeter.
The security perimeter dissected the parking lots surrounding MetLife Stadium, reducing available parking areas. This space was used instead for various game-related facilities: NFL operations, media and broadcast facilities, halftime show offices, and team operations. The Izod Center and the Meadowlands Racetrack Clubhouse also landed inside the security perimeter. Both facilities hosted pregame parties. Fans, therefore, passed through security screening before attending those events. The pedestrian overpass connecting parking deck 23 and the Izod Center to the MetLife Stadium area was inside the secured area as well.

There were nine security check points located inside tents called welcome pavilions. The security checkpoints were located around the secured perimeter where fans gained entry to the stadium area.129 Welcome Pavilion O, the owner’s pavilion, was adjacent to the Meadowlands Racetrack Clubhouse. Alongside Pavilion O was Welcome Pavilion 1, designated for attendees of the NFL Tailgate Party, Host Committee Hospitality, and Fox Party. Media entry was in a separate welcome pavilion located in Lot G1. General fan entry was accommodated through Welcome Pavilions 2 through 7. Welcome Pavilions 2 through 6 were located in the MetLife Stadium parking lots, and Welcome Pavilion 7 was located in parking deck 23, adjacent to the Izod Center. Welcome Pavilion 6 was adjacent to NJ TRANSIT’s Meadowlands Station and was designated for fans arriving by rail.

Party Planners West, Inc., a “full-service corporate event production” company,130 designed the welcome pavilions.131 All patrons entering the secured area did so through the welcome pavilions’ security screening and ticket scanning locations. All welcome pavilions were heated, had interior lighting, and astroturf floors. Power was provided to the pavilions by generator. K-9 units were stationed at the exterior of Pavilions 2 through 6, and berms were
constructed around the pavilions to protect against snow melt and rain. Pavilions 2 through 6, which were for fan entry, contained DJ entertainment, guest services desks (with time information and pre- and post-game information), LED screen programming, merchandise, and program sales. The welcome pavilions concept was intended to provide a dry, warm location for the security screening process that also would provide an entertainment experience. Super Bowl XLVIII was the first time the NFL used welcome pavilions. Pavilions 2 through 6, the primary general fan access pavilions, were divided in half. The layout of each side mirrored the other and contained security screening checkpoints. Fans entered the pavilions, followed paths created using security barriers through magnetometers. Separate access lanes were set up for ADA access. Pavilions 2 through 5 each had eighteen magnetometers. Inside the welcome pavilions, full security screenings were conducted on each person entering the secured area. Once fans had passed through the magnetometers, their tickets were scanned and they exited the pavilion to the stadium area.

Pavilion 6 was designed to handle a slightly higher capacity than Pavilions 2 through 5. Rather than containing eighteen magnetometers, Pavilion 6 contained twenty. The layout of Pavilion 6 was slightly different than Pavilions 2 through 5. Fans entered Pavilions 2 through 5 from one end of the tent, passed through security, then exited from the end of the tent directly opposite from the side they entered. The magnetometers were arranged in two nine-set arrays, positioned horizontally to the entrance and exit sides of the tent.
Pavilion 6 contained two ten-set arrays of magnetometers, positioned parallel to the side of the tent through which the fans entered. Fans exited the tent from the side facing MetLife Stadium, adjacent to and to the right of the entrance side of the tent. Despite these differences, Pavilion 6 contained the same security and entertainment arrangements as Pavilions 2 through 5.
Pavilion 6 also differed from Pavilions 2 through 5 in its egress layout. The interior of each pavilion was rearranged at a set time to turn around from fan ingress to fan egress. Pavilions 2 through 5 called for the magnetometers to stay in place, with the surrounding tables to be arranged between the magnetometers and enclosed by Tensa barriers. In addition, the interior security barriers were removed, providing a greater open area for fans to flow through the tent when exiting the Stadium.
The egress plan for Pavilion 6 differed in that the magnetometers and all other security apparatus were to be moved from the center of the pavilion to the rear and side of the pavilion, creating an open and unobstructed interior. As Pavilion 6 was dedicated to NJ TRANSIT rail passengers, rather than allowing fans to walk through the pavilion as they left the Stadium, Pavilion 6 was to act as a staging area for the rail platform. With the security apparatus moved to the sides and rear of the tent, Pavilion 6 was intended to serve as a “holding pen” similar to that used during other MetLife Stadium events during egress for rail passengers.
E.  Super Bowl Sunday

1.  Location of Key Individuals

During Super Bowl week, the Secaucus Junction Compound housed the emergency operation center (“EOC”) for NJ TRANSIT and the incident command post for NJTPD. The EOC served as a base for the coordination of resources and information by and between NJ TRANSIT business lines, the NJTPD, external transportation agencies and external law enforcement agencies. The EOC operated twenty-four hours per day, from 6:00 a.m. on January 27, 2014, through rush hour service on February 3, 2014—the day after the Super Bowl. It provided a centralized location to monitor services, provide interagency coordination, executive decision-making, communication, and information sharing. From the EOC, NJ TRANSIT could
oversee and direct service across the entire system monitoring events throughout the region with the goal of providing a standard level of service for ordinary commuters and enhanced service for Super Bowl guests. As is customary and in the interest of security, the EOC was located away from the MetLife Stadium.

On Super Bowl Sunday, NJ TRANSIT’s key decision-makers were stationed in the EOC, including Executive Director Weinstein, Chief Trucillo, Captain Clark, Kevin O’Connor, Joyce Gallagher and Rich Andreski. Commissioner Simpson apportioned his time between the EOC and other strategic locations.

In addition, the NFL established an on-site control room at MetLife Stadium. High ranking NJSP officials and James Minish, Executive Vice President - Facilities, of the NJSEA were stationed at NFL Control during the game.

2. Rail Travel to the Stadium - Super Bowl Ingress
   a. Background - An Early Arriving Crowd

The first NJ TRANSIT train was scheduled to leave Secaucus Junction for MetLife Stadium at 1:41 p.m., aligning it with the opening of the NFL welcome pavilions at approximately 2:00 p.m. The train and welcome pavilion schedule was widely publicized. Once guests entered the pavilion and underwent screening, they were free to proceed to the Stadium.

Fans, nevertheless, began assembling at Secaucus Junction several hours before the first train, as early as 9:00 a.m. With the crowd continuing to build before noon, NJ TRANSIT broadcast a reminder on Twitter at 11:46 a.m. that the first train was still two hours away:
Lots of #SB48 fans in Secaucus Jct - fans pls remember @MLStadium doesn’t open ‘til 2pm & the first #SB48GameTrain starts running at 1:41pm.

The crowd persisted and remained heavy until approximately 4:00 p.m.

As part of our investigation, we reviewed videotape footage of the crowd from several different camera angles. These videos enabled us to observe the crowd formation, queuing process and passenger flow at Secaucus Junction. During the pivotal period of 11:36 a.m. to 4:45 p.m., we reviewed videos from the upper concourse level, rotunda, mezzanine level, Platform H, and Platforms A/B.

b. Crowd Queuing and Passenger Flow Process

Before boarding a train to the Stadium, rail passengers were required to pass through a Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) security checkpoint for a bag check. Per the NFL’s bag policy, fans were only permitted to carry a “small clutch bag, approximately the size of a hand,” “[b]ags that are clear plastic, vinyl or PVC and do not exceed 12” x 6” x 12,” “or “[o]ne-gallon clear plastic freezer bag (Ziploc bag or similar).” These bags were subject to search by TSA agents. Game tickets were also inspected; fans without tickets were not permitted onboard a train.

TSA checkpoint areas were established on both the upper concourse level and mezzanine level of Secaucus Junction. Passengers were queued and routed through one of these checkpoints based on how they arrived at the station. Passengers arriving on tracks A, B, 2 or 3 from the Northeast Corridor, North Jersey Coast Line, Raritan Valley Line, Gladstone Line, Morristown Line or the Montclair-Boonton Line channeled through the upper concourse level. The bulk of these passengers originated from NY Penn Station. Passengers either dropped off at
the station or arriving on tracks E, F, G or H from the Main/Bergen-Port Jervis Line or Pascack Valley Line were directed through the mezzanine level.

i. **Upper Concourse Level**

On arrival, NY Penn Station passengers and all others exiting trains on tracks A, B, 2, or 3, were directed to the upper concourse level. As seen on the figure below, there are several access points from the tracks up to the upper concourse level, giving the NJTPD the ability to control these access points and manage queuing operations.

Passengers were first queued along the upper concourse level corridor. To control crowd flow, NJTPD, from time to time, set up a series of queuing areas in the corridor to handle crowd volume and keep certain areas of the corridor clear. These queuing areas led to a TSA checkpoint at the end of the corridor. As guests approached the checkpoint area, they were divided into rows depending on whether they carried a bag that needed to be inspected.
The rows were separated by yellow bicycle barricades.
Guests followed the yellow bicycle barricades to the security checkpoint. After passing through security, guests entered the rotunda.

NJ TRANSIT customer service is located in the rotunda along with a Dunkin Donuts, Sbarro pizzeria, The Junction Bar, and Faber News Now convenience store. Ambassadors in yellow shirts and hats were stationed throughout the rotunda directing guests. From the rotunda, guests were led down to the platforms on the lower level serving MetLife Stadium.

ii. **Mezzanine Level**

Passengers dropped off at the station by car/taxi or arriving from trains on tracks E, F, G or H followed a different path. These passengers were routed through the mezzanine level.
Guests entered this area from the hallway on the left and wrapped around into one of three columns based on whether they were carrying a bag.
These columns led to TSA screening tables. After screening, passengers were directed down the hallway to the right and onto the platform.

c. **Heavy Crowds Flood Secaucus**

By 11:30 a.m., small crowds began milling on the mezzanine level and in the rotunda. To begin security operations, NJTPD cleared the rotunda of all guests at approximately 11:50 a.m. These guests appear to have been sent down to the mezzanine level for processing through the TSA security checkpoint. With the TSA checkpoint not yet open, however, the crowd continued to build on the mezzanine level until around noon.

11:48 a.m. - Approach to Mezzanine Queuing Area
Shortly after noon, guests were processed through the checkpoint area and routed back up to the rotunda.\textsuperscript{136}

Although the first train was not scheduled to leave until 1:41 p.m., guests were released onto the platform at 12:05 p.m., apparently to help relieve the unexpected and early crowding in the station. Having filled the platform area so early, it was critical not to overload it. Thus, for safety reasons, NJ TRANSIT only allowed approximately 1,000 passengers onto the platform—less than a full train load (the first train carried 1,437 passengers).
12:09 p.m. - Passengers on Platform H Waiting for the First Train to MetLife Stadium.

These 1,000 guests stood on the platform for over an hour waiting to board the first train to the stadium. From our video review, the crowd appeared to wait patiently without altercations.

1:20 p.m. - Passengers Loading First Train
Releasing passengers onto the platform early only provided temporary relief. The upper concourse level, where riders coming from NY Penn Station were screened, faced heavy congestion throughout the ingress process. At noon, this area was virtually empty.

11:58 a.m. - Upper Concourse Queuing Area

Soon thereafter, however, traffic began building, and by 12:25 p.m., the area leading to the TSA checkpoint was packed.
It remained crowded for about fifteen minutes but emptied again until approximately 1:15 p.m.

From 1:15 p.m. to 3:55 p.m., this area was consistently crammed with crowds extending, at times, down the long corridor.
1:53 p.m. - Upper Concourse Level

2:32 p.m. - Upper Concourse Level
After 3:55 p.m., the crowd eased and the upper concourse corridor was intermittently congested with guests encountering only minimal waits.

After going through the upper concourse level security checkpoint, passengers next entered the rotunda and waited there to go down to the MetLife Stadium train platform. Although it was periodically busy, the rotunda, while fairly full at times, did not experience the same level of crowding as the upper concourse corridor area. Crowding primarily occurred during the first hour of train service when there were longer intervals between departing trains—approximately every fifteen minutes. During this time, the rotunda filled up, then emptied as passengers were released onto the platform below for loading. The cycle then repeated.

1:50 p.m. - Rotunda Crowd

After the 2:30 p.m. train to the Stadium, the burden on the rotunda greatly diminished as trains began to depart more quickly—approximately every eight to ten minutes. This faster load-and-
go pace essentially enabled passengers to flow from the rotunda down to the train platform with little back-up. From 2:30 p.m. on, there was only minimal crowding in the rotunda.

The heavy congestion on the upper concourse level had a trickle-down effect on guests arriving on Platforms A/B from NY Penn Station and other points along the Northeast Corridor. From approximately 2:15 p.m. to 3:05 p.m., on arrival, these guests were met by a sea of people waiting to exit the platform to get to the upper concourse level. As can be seen in the photograph below, the crowd needed to funnel through a doorway in order to take stairs or an escalator or an elevator to the queuing area upstairs. The sheer volume of in-bound passengers—trains were arriving every five to ten minutes—coupled with the congestion in the upper concourse level and the need to filter through the doorway created a bottleneck.

During the heaviest periods, the crowd extended back along the narrower areas of the platform.
To alleviate the platform crowding and any related safety issues, NJTPD temporarily halted further in-bound traffic from NY Penn Station at 2:38 p.m. The hold broke the bottleneck. It was lifted at 3:12 p.m., and by 3:15 p.m., the platform area was essentially clear. The A/B platform area did not back up for the remainder of the ingress process.

In contrast with the upper concourse level, the mezzanine level experienced sporadic crowding. The TSA queuing area would occasionally back up for fifteen to twenty minutes but then clear as guests were screened and released. To illustrate this cycle, we have included below photographs that show the mezzanine area relatively empty at 2:06 p.m. and 2:51 p.m., but full at 2:36 p.m.
2:06 p.m. - Empty Mezzanine Level

2:36 p.m. - Mezzanine Level
2:36 p.m. - Mezzanine Level

2:51 p.m. - Mezzanine Level Empty Again
d. **Reports of Heat Issues in the Station**

At about 1:00 p.m., an ambassador reported that the heat system on the platform servicing MetLife Stadium—Platform G/H—was blowing too high. The platform area had already been loaded with passengers waiting for the first train, who were dressed for an outdoor football game. The issue was reported to the station facilities manager, ABM Industries, Inc., and an engineer was dispatched to inspect the heating units on the G/H platforms.

About an hour later, the NJTPD reported that it was hot throughout the station. Around this time, NJ TRANSIT became inundated with customer complaints on social media:

- @NJTRANSIT sweating and miserable in secaucus, no end in sight. Not impressed with #transitbowl (1:52 PM)
- HELP! Stuck in Secaucus Junction with few thousand fans dying from heat. @nfl @NJTRANSIT (2:00 PM)
- @NJTRANSIT Lots of complaints about heat in Secaucus (2:07 PM)
- @NJTRANSIT please address the temperature and crowds at #secaucus station. Scary hot and crowded in here - haven’t moved in 30 mins (2:09 PM)
- @NJTRANSIT turn on the AC at secaucus station! Waiting for #SB48gametrain and I’m passing out from heat exhaustion! (2:11 PM)
- @starledger @NJ_TRANSIT This is horrible! People are getting sick all over the place with no medical attention!
- Many #sb48- bound travelers complaining of heat at Secaucus @NJ-TRANSIT station. … (2:26 PM from Newark Star Ledger).

NJ TRANSIT directly responded to many customer complaints\(^\text{138}\) and also tweeted updates to the general public:

- Trains operating to stadium on load-n-go basis. W/ many looking to catch 1st trains, we know it’s warm. Pls know crews are working on it\(^\text{139}\)
AC in Secaucus Jct cranked to full blast - trains operating to stadium on a load-n-go basis. We’re getting you there as fast as possible.\(^{140}\)

At 2:29 p.m., ABM reported that it was routing outside air into the building. By 2:49 p.m., the air conditioning was running at maximum capacity. Despite these efforts, the temperature in the rotunda was 77 degrees at 3:32 p.m., and the temperature in the long corridor was 80 degrees at 3:24 p.m.\(^{141}\)

The Emergency Medical Services team stationed at Secaucus Junction (EMS of Meadowlands Hospital) treated five people for heat-related complaints. All five refused medical attention and were released. Guests complaining of heat were given water and fresh air, but despite media reports,\(^{142}\) we found no evidence of guests passing out or suffering any severe medical distress. Indeed, NJ TRANSIT publicly disputed these claims on social media\(^{143}\) and in post-game interviews.

Guests nevertheless were exposed to uncomfortable temperatures because of unseasonably warm outdoor temperatures, large crowds packed into a confined area, guests dressed for cold weather, and the inability of the HVAC system to quickly reduce the interior temperature.

e. **In-Bound Ridership Volume**

NJ TRANSIT tracked ridership volume on a real-time basis. Through technology, NJ TRANSIT could accurately count the number of passengers boarding each train at Secaucus Junction. Periodically, NJ TRANSIT broadcast this in-bound ridership data over Twitter:

- 3:04 PM NJ TRANSIT tweeted - “as of 3pm, 13,500 fans have taken the #SB48GameTrain to @MLStadium. Trains continue to operate on a load-n-go basis, getting you there asap.”\(^{144}\)
• 4:18 NJ TRANSIT tweeted - “#TransitBowl is in motion setting record ridership to the stadium, as of 4pm #SB48GameTrain has carried 22,000 fans to @MLStadium”\textsuperscript{145}

• 4:47 NJ TRANSIT tweeted - “Record ridership continues to grow, 27,000+ fans on the #SB48GameTrain to @MLStadium as of 4:30pm #TransitBowl.”\textsuperscript{146}

• 6:34 NJ TRANSIT tweeted - “For the first #TransitBowl ever we transported a record-breaking 28,000 fans to @MLStadium for #SB48 (over 1/3 of stadium attendance).”\textsuperscript{147}

During in-bound operations, NJ TRANSIT carried over 28,000 passengers to MetLife Stadium. With the NFL’s blessing, the first train left for the stadium at 1:31 p.m.—ten minutes earlier than scheduled. Due to equipment issues, the next train did not depart until 2:00 p.m. We were advised that the delay was caused by a problem cold starting the engine. The next three trains were loaded and departed at about fifteen minute intervals. These first five trains all left from track H. At 2:52 p.m., NJ TRANSIT began using two tracks (G & H), enabling the loading of trains at approximately eight minute intervals. The following chart depicts peak volume between 1:30 p.m. and 4:30 p.m. By 4:30 p.m., two hours before kickoff, Secaucus Junction was essentially crowd free.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Train</th>
<th>Departure Time from Secaucus Junction</th>
<th>Passenger Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2201</td>
<td>1:31 PM</td>
<td>1,437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2203</td>
<td>2:00 PM</td>
<td>1,486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2205</td>
<td>2:16 PM</td>
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<td>2207</td>
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<tr>
<td>2209</td>
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<td>6:24 PM</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2255</td>
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In contrast, the parking lots near Meadowlands Station were fairly empty as of 4:30 p.m. The following photograph captures the Fan Express Bus lot, which abutted the train loading area.

4:36 p.m. - Photo of Parking Lot Abutting Pavilion 5

During ingress, fans were periodically rerouted by foot from Pavilion 6 to Pavilion 5. This overflow process was employed to speed fan entry into the stadium at times when Pavilion 6 was too crowded to efficiently process offloading train passengers through security.
Photo showing Pavilion 6 located behind the pedestrian overpass and Pavilion 5 at the left edge

Photo of Fans walking from Pavilion 6 to Pavilion 5
3. Plans to Handle Unexpected Rail Ridership

As the real-time ridership data trickled in, NJ TRANSIT began considering its egress options. Little could be done to enhance rail service out of Meadowlands Station. NJ TRANSIT already intended to run the largest trains available (bi-level, ten-car trains) at the fastest intervals possible. “The signal system [could] not support more frequent service.”148 Running efficiently and at maximum capacity, the rail system could transport approximately 12,000 to 13,000 passengers per hour from the Stadium to Secaucus Junction.149 Under the best conditions, therefore, the rail system could move 33,000 passengers out of MetLife Stadium in about two hours and thirty minutes.

Aside from rail, NJ TRANSIT also had 300 buses on stand-by for emergency purposes. These buses represented the only “available option[] to increase service.”150 With the exiting ridership expected to exceed 30,000 passengers, NJ TRANSIT weighed activating its bus contingency plan.

a. Bus Contingency Plan

As part of its planning effort, NJ TRANSIT developed a bus contingency plan for Super Bowl Sunday.151 The plan was designed primarily as a safety valve in case the rail system went down for an extended period of time. “NJ TRANSIT Bus [was] to serve as ‘provider of last resort’ in the event of rail service disruptions, weather or other incidents, or other performance shortfalls.”152 As a general proposition, bus service was not intended to operate in tandem with rail, however, NJ TRANSIT’s contingency planning contemplated activating bus service in the event “[p]assenger demand variations exceed rail capacity,”153 or, in other words, “extreme crowding.”154
The contingency plan addressed four main scenarios: (1) no NJ TRANSIT Rail Service between MetLife Stadium and Secaucus, (2) no NJ TRANSIT Rail service between NY Penn Station and Secaucus Junction and no NJ TRANSIT Rail service between Secaucus Junction and MetLife Stadium, (3) no NJ TRANSIT Rail service between NY Penn Station and Secaucus Junction, and (4) no NJ TRANSIT Rail service between Secaucus Junction and MetLife Stadium. To be ready to provide back-up at any of these locations, NJ TRANSIT pre-positioned buses and operators at strategic locations near the Meadowlands, Secaucus Junction and NY Penn Station: Vince Lombardi Park & Ride, NJ TRANSIT Meadowlands Garage, NJ TRANSIT Weehawken Bus Parking Lot, NJ TRANSIT Fairview Garage, Hoboken, and the NJ TRANSIT Ironbound Garage in Newark. The number of available stand-by buses varied depending on the time of day, with at least 300 buses available during peak travel time.

The bus contingency plan was a plan of last resort. “The use of NJ TRANSIT buses in shuttling fans to/from the stadium would only be in an extreme emergency that the train line to/from the Meadowlands is completely inoperable.” During a July 2013 meeting with the NFL, NJ TRANSIT, SP+ Gameday, Populous, and the Host Committee, the consensus was that in the event of a rail incident the preferred options were “(1) fix the rail; (2) divert to PATH and Hoboken; (3) then backup bus as a last resort.”

Initially, Lot B, located between West Peripheral Road and Route 120, was pinpointed as the bus contingency staging area. NJ TRANSIT preferred this location because it placed the bus loading area near Meadowlands Station and provided ample space. On August 21, 2013, members of NJ TRANSIT, SP+ Gameday, the Host Committee, and NJSEA met at the Meadowlands to review bus contingency staging operations. A NJ TRANSIT bus was brought
on-site to determine whether it could enter, exit, and maneuver through Lot B. The bus drive-through showed Lot B to be problematic for bus maneuverability. Therefore, another loading zone was needed.

Ultimately, NJ TRANSIT’s bus contingency plan for moving guests out of MetLife Stadium envisioned “operat[ing] 2 separate contingency plans at the same time.” Under the first plan, passengers would board buses curbside along West Peripheral Road for a one-seat ride to the Port Authority Bus Terminal in New York.

**NJ Transit Bus W Peripheral Rd Layout**

This option allowed passengers traveling to Manhattan to bypass the Secaucus hub. Under the second plan, passengers would board buses along the shoulder of NJ Route 120 South for a ride
to Secaucus Junction. Space was limited at both loading areas. There was only enough room at each location to stage a maximum of ten fifty-passenger buses at a time for a load-and-go operation. The campus layout, shown below, and related security features offered no larger bus staging area that also would have been near the train loading zone.

![Campus map available at http://www.nfl.com/static/content/public/photo/2014/01/15/0ap2000000313699.pdf](http://www.nfl.com/static/content/public/photo/2014/01/15/0ap2000000313699.pdf)

The contingency plan laid out a nine-step implementation process, including notifying NJSP Command, asking for NJT or NJSP police assistance at key intersections, and deploying NJ TRANSIT ambassadors to Pavilion 6 to direct passengers to the appropriate loading zone. The plan contained detailed driving directions for bus drivers.
Executive Policy Group/EOC Conference Call

In light of the unexpected number of inbound passengers, at 6:00 p.m., NJ TRANSIT’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Executive Policy Group held a forty-seven minute conference call to discuss egress plans. Participants on the call included Executive Director Weinstein, Chief Trucillo, Captain Clark, Kevin O’Connor, Joyce Gallagher and Rich Andreski. In addition to interviewing each of these individuals, we reviewed detailed meeting minutes of this conference call, which appear to be an almost verbatim transcript. \(^{162}\)

After reviewing the weather and record number of in-bound passengers, Executive Director Weinstein framed the call as “figur[ing] out what our approach to the exit is.” Due to the unexpected ridership volume, NJ TRANSIT had been receiving calls from the State Office of Emergency Management, the NFL, and Commissioner Simpson “focused on” the exit strategy. To that end, Executive Director Weinstein turned the call over to his rail executives for guidance.

Taking the lead, Kevin O’Connor, then Vice President and General Manager, Rail Operations, stated that they’d “like to . . . continue w[ith] the plan as set up; to utilize rail and only rail, the concern is if we try to use bus and rail together if we had an operational concern, we’d have used our back up as a primary and that will preclude us from using our backup.” His focus was avoiding “overcrowding in Secaucus.” To address this concern, he suggested that they had the ability to “meter” flow into Secaucus by “hold[ing] back trains in the Meadowlands.” He then discussed additional rail cars that could be used to move passengers out of Secaucus Junction.

Chief Trucillo interceded and raised the “possibility of staging some buses at the Meadowlands” to provide a second egress option. He continued:
we have a crowd we’ve never seen before, if that crowd backs up we’re gonna get pressure from the NFL and other people ‘why aren’t you utilizing bus to move people’ and it’s gonna be difficult; I hear what Kevin’s saying, the bus is a bus plan to supplement rail . . . if rail isn’t operational, maybe we can even take half the fleet and have another option there given the size of the crowd coming out, let’s discuss it.

The bus contingency plan, according to Joyce Gallagher, then Vice President and General Manager, Bus Operations, was to “line up buses up right alongside the track to take people to Secaucus or NY.” If all 300 available buses were deployed, she believed it would take “several hours” to load them all because they only had enough space alongside West Peripheral Road to load ten buses at a time. Because of these space limitations, NJ TRANSIT bus operations could move approximately 2,500 to 3,000 passengers per hour from West Peripheral Road. She also advised that once mobilized, 100 buses could be stacked at MetLife Stadium within a half hour. For unknown reasons, NJ TRANSIT did not discuss using the NJ Route 120 South staging area, as set forth in the written contingency plans, which theoretically could have increased capacity. In addition, the minutes do not reflect any discussion about requesting a larger staging area from the NFL.

Chief Trucillo viewed sending 100 buses to MetLife Stadium as “step A” because it provided some relief and still left 200 buses in reserve. Alternatively, Chief Trucillo presented the option of sending those 100 buses to Secaucus instead of MetLife Stadium. Like others, his “concern from a public safety point of view [was] Secaucus.” NJ TRANSIT considered it safer to queue a large group of people in the Stadium parking lot rather than the smaller confines of Secaucus Junction. To put these spatial concerns into perspective, Secaucus Junction’s
certificate of occupancy lists the maximum number of occupants as 5,635. Preventing a crowd at Secaucus was viewed as a higher priority than alleviating the crowd at MetLife Stadium.

The group then debated the merits of splitting the 100 buses between MetLife Stadium and Secaucus, but there appeared to be little support for this measure. Eventually, Executive Director Weinstein concluded that “putting buses at the Meadowlands is out of the question.” The basis for the decision appears to be threefold. First, Executive Director Weinstein did not want to sacrifice the “safety net” in case “the NEC[Northeast Corridor] goes down, a tunnel goes out,” or something else unexpected occurred. Second, the focus was on preventing overcrowding at Secaucus Junction as opposed to the large, open-air Meadowlands Sports Complex. Finally, there was a belief that deploying the buses would not have appreciably sped up the egress process. As Executive Director Weinstein put it, “the reality is [the buses are] not going to speed anything up; it’s still going to take 2.5 to 3 hours to move the people.” For these reasons, he directed the buses be moved to Secaucus, rather than the Meadowlands, and placed on standby in case Secaucus Junction got overwhelmed. Executive Director Weinstein believed that Secaucus Junction could handle the first wave of 15,000 riders coming from the stadium, but that buses might be needed to help move the remainder.

While some suggested to us the NFL discouraged the deployment of buses, it does not appear to have expressed an opinion. On this point, Rich Andreski said during the call that “the only info from the NFL is that they’re aware of our continuity of busing plan, pick the plan that works for us, they are already aware.”
c. Commissioner Simpson’s Requests to Deploy the Buses

Following the EOC conference call, Executive Director Weinstein relayed the decision to Commissioner Simpson. Commissioner Simpson was in favor of using the buses to help relieve the MetLife Stadium crowd, and he claimed he voiced his support for the measure. Executive Director Weinstein said he defended the decision by stressing that they did not want to be left without emergency back-up. He explained to Commissioner Simpson that the main concern was overburdening Secaucus Junction and that they were taking steps to prevent that from happening. Commissioner Simpson recalled Executive Director Weinstein saying that implementing the bus plan was a very involved process that needed to be cleared with lots of people and that they could move 30,000 people in two and a half hours by rail. Commissioner Simpson claimed he told Executive Director Weinstein that he was making a mistake.

Commissioner Simpson then drove to the Secaucus EOC sometime after 8:00 p.m. and requested a debriefing from Executive Director Weinstein and the NJ TRANSIT team. He was again told by Executive Director Weinstein and Rich Andreski that they were sticking to the playbook and moving guests by rail alone. According to Commissioner Simpson, the NJ TRANSIT team was resigned to the fact that there would be extended wait times. Indeed, in the weeks leading up to the Super Bowl, Executive Director Weinstein cautioned in a memo to Wayne Hasenbalg, President and CEO of NJSEA and Al Kelly, CEO of the NY/NJ Super Bowl Host Committee that:

Except for the . . . buses, NJ TRANSIT has no other available options to increase service. If ridership greatly exceeds the estimated 12,000 people, guests will experience extended wait times for service. (emphasis in original).  

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Commissioner Simpson claimed he asked what harm would come from supplementing rail service with buses. According to Commissioner Simpson, Executive Director Weinstein responded that he would only deploy the buses at the Stadium if Commissioner Simpson put the order in writing and took responsibility for the consequences. Commissioner Simpson described it as a “no-win” situation. He did not believe he had the authority to give Executive Director Weinstein an order to deploy the buses. Moreover, since he had not been involved in the Super Bowl planning, Commissioner Simpson told us he was unwilling to countermand two years of planning. He was also concerned that ordering the buses might interfere with security operations. Therefore, he said he noted his objection but deferred to Executive Director Weinstein.

Executive Director Weinstein, on the other hand, did not remember Commissioner Simpson being so explicit. While he acknowledged that Commissioner Simpson expressed some concerns regarding the bus decision, Executive Director Weinstein said he talked through the reasoning and did not receive any push back. Executive Director Weinstein also did not recall demanding that Commissioner Simpson put any orders in writing, but had Commissioner Simpson done so, Executive Director Weinstein said he would have complied.

4. **Super Bowl Egress - Rail**

   a. **Super Bowl Loading Plan**

The Super Bowl XLVIII egress plan was conceived and designed to function similar to the plan used during other events at the Stadium—but on a larger scale. The post-game plan was based on an estimated ridership of 12,000 passengers, developed with an estimated capacity of
1,300 passengers per train. It assumed, as at past Super Bowls, twenty-five percent of the fans would leave before game’s end.

The plan called for NJ TRANSIT personnel, located in the platform area, to direct passengers to the appropriate platform and train. NJTPD officers would be stationed in the platform area for security purposes. NJ TRANSIT personnel and NJTPD were not credentialed to enter the Pavilion, which restricted them to the platform area and other areas outside the secured perimeter. NJSEA personnel were permitted inside the secured perimeter, but they had no supervisory role inside Pavilion 6. In the station area, their duties were focused on the platform area instead. The NJSP provided additional security in the platform area.

Inside Pavilion 6, S.A.F.E. was responsible for crowd management and running the penning and queuing process. NJSP were assigned to the interior of Pavilion 6 to provide security. Finally, the overall operations of Pavilion 6 were to be monitored by an NFL employee, who was called the “pavilion captain.”

Once the game began, “turnover” of Pavilion 6 was to commence in order to prepare the pavilion for post-game egress. All the security apparatus was to be moved to the side or rear of the tent, and all barricades and gates were to be removed. The post-game egress plan did not call for any lines, pens, or barricades to be set up inside Pavilion 6. Once complete, the interior of Pavilion 6 was to be an open space in which to pen one train load of passengers. It was contemplated that fans leaving the Stadium would enter the pavilion and move through the interior area to wait to exit and board the next-available train.
Once full, the doors to Pavilion 6 would be closed and the area immediately to the exterior of the tent, cordoned off by gates, was to act as a holding pen for the next train load of passengers. Once the passengers waiting inside the tent exited to the platform to board a train, the passengers waiting outside Pavilion 6 would fill the tent and wait for the next train to be loaded. If both Pavilion 6 and the outside pen were full, an additional queue area was to be set up parallel to Meadowlands Station. The plan for Super Bowl Sunday was designed to mimic the controls in place at the Stadium since 2009, that is, manage the crowd and ensure each train was loaded to capacity without overloading.

While based on the typical event loading process, several differences were evident on Super Bowl Sunday. First, S.A.F.E. assumed NJSEA’s customary crowd management role.
inside Pavilion 6. NJSEA personnel were limited to assisting the loading process in the platform area. Second, most of the NJSP assigned to Meadowlands Station, including the lead Trooper inside the Pavilion, did not have MetLife Stadium event experience. Third, NJ TRANSIT’s role was reduced to crowd management once the passengers entered the platform area. NJSEA, NJ TRANSIT personnel and NJTPD were relieved of their typical roles in the queuing and penning process. Finally, the enclosed Pavilion 6 was a variation from the typical open-air queuing process using bicycle gates and rope lines.

b. **Halftime Meeting**

At 4:48 p.m., the NFL’s Pavilion 6 captain, Daphne Wood, sent an email to members of NJ TRANSIT, NJSEA, Populous, SP+ Gameday, and the Host Committee, calling for a meeting at Pavilion 6 to walk through the egress process in light of the increased rail ridership. Approximately twenty minutes later, Ms. Wood sent a follow-up email setting the meeting for 6:45 p.m. and raising the possibility of contingency bus use. Mike Witte of SP+ Gameday attended the meeting and indicated that he recalled seeing Daphne Wood, Jim Minish, Mary Musca, among others. He recalled people breaking into groups to talk about specific issues rather than a large group meeting.

Witte was directed to work on repositioning direction signs for parking areas and the train station in order to ensure that fans who entered the Stadium through welcome pavilions other than Pavilion 6 would be able to locate the rail station. Witte was unaware of any discussions of how to handle the interior of Pavilion 6. Minish stated that, at halftime, he extended the queue line by approximately 800 feet to compensate for the increased rail ridership during the egress process, but he did not participate in a group meeting. Shortly before the meeting, at 6:26 p.m.,
Witte circulated an email with a sketch showing how vehicle flow could work if the contingency bus plan was implemented.\textsuperscript{170}

c. **Train Departures**

On Super Bowl Sunday, trains departed Meadowlands Station hourly from 2:48 p.m. through 7:48 p.m., carrying small passenger loads to Secaucus Junction, with the largest passenger load of 125 passengers on the 6:48 p.m. train. The first train to depart the Meadowlands Station with a significant passenger load was at 8:52 p.m., carrying 480 passengers. As fans began exiting MetLife Stadium in increased numbers, the penning, queuing, and loading plan commenced. The first fully-loaded train of 1,410 passengers departed Meadowland Station at 9:22 p.m. The next train to depart, with 1,721 passengers, left thirty-three minutes later at 9:55 p.m.\textsuperscript{171} During this delay, the crowd built up significantly.

Thereafter, trains ran more efficiently, departing between every eight and thirteen minutes. There was one departure gap of twenty minutes, occurring between 11:15 p.m. and 11:35 p.m. The last fully-loaded train of 1,650 passengers departed at 12:50 a.m., and two lightly-loaded trains, with less than fifty passengers each, departed at 1:00 a.m. and 1:05 a.m.

In order to determine the cause of the two notable delays, we interviewed on-site personnel of NJ TRANSIT, NJTPD, NJSEA, the NJSP, the NFL, and S.A.F.E. We reviewed video footage from NJ TRANSIT cameras, which provided exterior views of Meadowlands Station and the areas adjacent to Pavilion 6. We reviewed interior video footage, provided by the NFL, of Pavilion 6 and of the exterior of Pavilion 6 in the platform area.
d. **Video Observations and Eye Witness Commentary**

NJ TRANSIT and the NFL provided videos of the egress process. NJ TRANSIT provided videos shot from NJ TRANSIT cameras located on MetLife Stadium and the tower located between MetLife Stadium and Meadowlands Station. The various angles provided show the exterior area of Pavilion 6 and the platforms of Meadowlands Station.

9:00 p.m. - Exterior of Pavilion 6

![Image of Pavilion 6 exterior](image_url)

The video provided by the NFL showed the interior of Pavilion 6 and the exterior of Pavilion 6 in the platform area. Two cameras offered the best footage inside Pavilion 6. They were mounted at the rear of the tent and faced the exit doors to the platform area. Each camera captured approximately half of Pavilion 6; together the cameras provided a nearly full view of the Pavilion 6 ingress and egress doors.
By 9:00 p.m., as fans began leaving the Stadium, Pavilion 6 started to fill with passengers. Even though the egress plan called for an open pen inside Pavilion 6, shortly after 9:00 p.m., an attempt was made to line up or organize the passengers inside Pavilion 6. Passengers were waiting in the front area of Pavilion 6, and additional passengers were lined up along the right side of the tent, stretching to the rear of the tent, and eventually wrapping around the back side of the tent.
As passengers continued to enter Pavilion 6, the line began wrapping towards the front of the tent. Some passengers entering the Pavilion drifted towards the front of the tent, rather than lining up behind passengers who had entered the tent earlier.

As passengers continued to enter Pavilion 6 and migrate towards the front of the tent, some passengers waiting at the rear moved forward, causing everyone in the back half of the tent to move forward.
Once the crowd pushed forward, passengers continued to enter, and at 9:12 p.m., both sets of egress doors were opened to allow the passengers to exit to the platform area. By 9:14 p.m., Pavilion 6 was empty. The passengers that exited Pavilion 6 at this time boarded and departed on a 9:22 p.m. train to Secaucus Junction.

At this point, the NJSP took charge of Pavilion 6. The NJSP understood its role was to provide security and ensure safety for Super Bowl guests. With this limited but important role, the NJSP was generally not involved in non-security related details of the transit planning, like the penning and queuing system. However, the NJSP perceived a safety issue with the way the
system was being implemented and, in particular, the way passengers were being organized inside the pavilion and, as a result, deemed it necessary to intervene in the process. In our interviews, NJSP officials described the safety issue with various degrees of severity. On the one end, we were told that the NJSP observed trample-like conditions and that guests were in fear of being crushed. The Sergeant in charge of the pavilion, on the other end, described the conditions less critically. She observed a lack of crowd flow control and general disorder in the queuing process. She also saw some pushing and shoving as guests maneuvered to get closer to the exit doors and sensed crowd unrest which she believed needed to be addressed. Our video review and other eye witness interviews support the Sergeant’s account.

To address these concerns, the NJSP stopped passengers from entering the pavilion and began moving corrals in the interior of Pavilion 6. The NJSP blocked off the right-side egress doors to the platform and created smaller pens inside the tent. The corrals were set up to leave open areas in the center of the tent so that the NJSP could get to the middle of the crowd in the event that an incident occurred.
For approximately four minutes, no passengers entered Pavilion 6 as a crowd began to form outside the tent.

At 9:18 p.m., passengers resumed entering Pavilion 6 through one set of doors and were directed to the front areas of the tent in the direction of the egress doors. The entry process was slow because the number of passengers entering the pavilion was being counted. After several minutes of passengers entering Pavilion 6 through one set of doors, the second set of ingress doors towards the rear of Pavilion 6 were opened, and entering passengers were directed to the pen area set up at the rear of the Pavilion. At 9:23 p.m., all ingress doors were closed for approximately five minutes, and the exterior video shows corrals being set up at the outside of the ingress doors in order to create paths to each door opening. By this time, the crowd was leaving the Stadium in droves, and passengers began lining up in the queuing area.
At 9:28 p.m., passengers resumed entering Pavilion 6, and the rear area of the tent continued to fill. Once the rear area was full, incoming passengers were directed towards the middle area.

Passenger ingress continued until approximately 9:37 p.m. when the ingress doors were closed and one set of egress doors were opened (the other being blocked by corrals) to allow passengers
to begin exiting Pavilion 6. At 9:37 p.m., the passengers exiting Pavilion 6 were the first passengers to exit since the prior train load of passengers finished exiting at 9:14 p.m., a delay of approximately twenty-three minutes.

During this twenty-three minute period, NJ TRANSIT, NJTPD and NJSEA did not know why passengers were not exiting the pavilion. They were not credentialed to enter the pavilion and could only peer through the doors to see what was happening. From the EOC in Secaucus, NJ TRANSIT had video feeds from only the exterior areas of Pavilion 6 and Meadowlands Station. They too could not see inside the pavilion. From this vantage point, they saw the heavy crowd building on the outside, people slowly entering the pavilion and nobody leaving. Those at the NJ TRANSIT EOC frantically called on-site NJTPD and NJ TRANSIT officials to move passengers onto the waiting trains, but they had no authority to open the pavilion doors. A S.A.F.E. supervisor told a NJ TRANSIT staffer that they were attempting to control the number of people entering Pavilion 6 so that the pavilion did not have more passengers than could fit on one train. From what we could piece together, the exit doors were not opened until a full train load of passengers were inside the pavilion.

During the delay, an NJSEA staff member called James Minish in the NFL control booth to inform him that the NJSP had taken over Pavilion 6 and that, despite waiting trains, no one was exiting the pavilion. Turning to the video feed in the control booth, Minish observed troopers moving corrals inside Pavilion 6. He confronted the NJSP senior leadership in the control booth about the troopers’ intervention. The NJSP complained that Minish overreacted and inappropriately criticized the NJSP; Minish admits to a heated conversation with the NJSP but defends his reaction. Minish and NJSP Captain Mark Mangan immediately left the control
booth for Pavilion 6 to oversee the egress process. The NFL did not get involved in these crowd control issues as it defers to law enforcement on safety and security measures.

As fans finally began exiting Pavilion 6, the queue line outside Pavilion 6 continued to lengthen. Due to the corrals set up inside Pavilion 6, it took much longer for passengers to walk through the pavilion than any other time throughout the night. In total, it took eleven minutes for the crowd to exit Pavilion 6 due, in part, to the passengers in the back half of the tent having to narrow down to a small walking path along the side of the tent before being able to continue forward to the exit doors.
By the time egress was complete at 9:48 p.m., the queue outside Pavilion 6 had grown significantly. As can be seen below, the queue extended the length of the corrals and wrapped around in the direction of Pavilion 6.

View from Stadium Camera

View from Tower East Camera
Just after the Pavilion 6 egress doors were closed at 9:48 p.m., passengers waiting outside the tent along West Peripheral Road, who arrived alongside Pavilion 6 after exiting through another security checkpoint, were released to the platform to complete the loading of the next train to leave. These passengers boarded and departed a 9:55 p.m. train to Secaucus Junction. This train was the first train to depart Meadowlands Station since 9:22 p.m., a thirty-three minute delay between trains.

Immediately following the close of the egress doors of Pavilion 6 at 9:48 p.m., the NJSP began removing the corrals in the front half of the tent, while leaving the corrals in place at the rear and those blocking one set of egress doors. Also during this time, a small crowd of passengers remained inside Pavilion 6 near the front left of the tent.

At 9:54 p.m., the NJSP removed a passenger from the crowd in handcuffs and escorted him from Pavilion 6. Not until 9:58 p.m., ten minutes after the passengers exited the pavilion, did passengers again begin entering Pavilion 6. At this time, passengers were allowed to free flow through the pavilion onto the platform rather than being penned. By 10:00 p.m., the back portion
of Pavilion 6 was cordoned off from the front, and passengers continued to enter and directly exit to the platform area.

Viewed from the exterior at the same time that passengers are entering Pavilion 6, passengers can be seen exiting to the middle platform.
At approximately 10:02 p.m., Minish and Captain Mangan arrived in Pavilion 6. Just after their arrival, tent ingress stopped, and Minish consulted with the NJSP. Minish and Captain Mangan, veterans of the normal egress process at the stadium, ordered the corrals removed and explained to those in the pavilion the queuing and loading process. They removed the corrals blocking one set of egress doors to the platform area so that passengers could exit from both sets of doors to the platform. At 10:33 p.m., passengers began exiting Pavilion 6 through both sets of exit doors, the first time both sets of exit doors were used since 9:14 p.m. For approximately the next half hour, tent ingress and egress continued in an overlapping manner.

As passengers continued to move through Pavilion 6, NJSEA, the NJSP, S.A.F.E., and NJ TRANSIT worked to resume the original penning and queuing plan. Minish estimated that it took about twenty-five minutes to establish a pattern of filling the tent, releasing the passengers to the platform, and then refilling the tent. Once a pattern developed, Minish and Captain Mangan oversaw the tent ingress process, and two senior NJSEA staff members oversaw the egress process.

By 11:03 p.m., a rhythm was established with no overlap between passengers entering and exiting Pavilion 6. By this time, ingress and egress were occurring separately, allowing Pavilion 6 to fill before passengers exited to the platform area. Under this rhythm, the tent was filled, the entrance doors were closed, and then the exit doors were opened and passengers exited to the platforms. Once the tent was empty, the exit doors were closed, the entrance doors were opened, and ingress resumed. During this time, passenger ingress to Pavilion 6 took approximately seven to eight minutes, and egress lasted approximately four to five minutes. This
pattern continued until the crowd was small enough to be safely allowed to free flow onto the platform.

In addition to managing the crowds exiting Pavilion 6, additional fans queued adjacent to Pavilion 6 alongside West Peripheral Road. These fans likely entered through Pavilion 5 during pre-game ingress as part of the overflow operations and exited using the same route they entered. NJ TRANSIT handled this second queue line by releasing groups of about four hundred passengers in intervals timed to ensure that fans were not exiting Pavilion 6 simultaneously. This process of queuing and releasing the fans arriving along West Peripheral Road was repeated throughout the night until all fans had been returned to Secaucus Junction. We found no pre-event forecast or planning for fans arriving at Meadowlands Station after the game by this approach rather than directly through Pavilion 6.

The following table shows the train departures from Meadowlands Station to Secaucus Junction provided by NJ TRANSIT, including the departure time and estimated number of passengers:
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<td>10:26 PM</td>
<td>660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2272</td>
<td>10:34 PM</td>
<td>1,730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2274</td>
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<td>2276</td>
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<td>1,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2278</td>
<td>11:08 PM</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2280</td>
<td>11:15 PM</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2282</td>
<td>11:35 PM</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2284</td>
<td>11:40 PM</td>
<td>1,945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2286</td>
<td>11:49 PM</td>
<td>1,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2288</td>
<td>12:02 AM</td>
<td>1,454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2290</td>
<td>12:13 AM</td>
<td>2,080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2292</td>
<td>12:24 AM</td>
<td>2,231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2294</td>
<td>12:35 AM</td>
<td>570</td>
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<tr>
<td>2296</td>
<td>12:41 AM</td>
<td>1,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2298</td>
<td>12:50 AM</td>
<td>1,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2200</td>
<td>1:00 AM</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2202</td>
<td>1:05 AM</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>33,397</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
e. **Performance Analysis**

This data and the video and eyewitness evidence reveals:

First, the longest delay between train departures was thirty-three minutes, occurring between 9:22 p.m. and 9:55 p.m. Before the delay, the evidence shows that S.A.F.E. directed some passengers inside Pavilion 6 to line up, while other passengers were allowed to enter and move in front of passengers who had entered earlier. As a result, a rush to the front of the tent occurred, likely causing some pushing and shoving between passengers. The NJSP indicated that it was concerned about passenger safety inside Pavilion 6 due to crowding and pushing and shoving. The lining up of passengers and rush to the front of the tent may have led to the NJSP determination. The NJSP officer in charge of the pavilion did not have prior experience with MetLife Stadium train crowds, but we do not know whether that had any impact on the decision to intervene.

The thirty-three minute delay was caused, in part, by the amount of time the NJSP took to set up corrals inside Pavilion 6 and outside Pavilion 6 near the entrance doors. This delay was exacerbated by the time it took for the passengers to exit Pavilion 6 due to the bottlenecks created inside the tent by the configuration of the corrals. Egress times during the rest of the penning and queuing process took approximately five minutes, while the egress time during this delay was eleven minutes. In addition, the evidence shows that the pavilion ingress process took nearly twenty minutes instead of the seven to eight minutes needed later in the night.

There also appears to have been some confusion as to whether the pavilion needed to be first filled with a train-load of passengers before the exit doors could be opened. The NJTPD was against allowing passengers to free-flow onto the train platform, while others in the NJ
TRANSIT organization appeared to support the abandonment of the penning and queuing system in favor of free-flow. The NJTPD concern was that free-flow, without proper controls, could lead to overcrowding of the train platforms and attendant safety issues. The egress process appears to have vacillated throughout the evening between strict adherence to a penning system and more of a free-flow system. For this first train, the strict adherence to a penning system coupled with the long amount of time it took to fill and empty the pavilion helped cause the thirty-three minute departure delay.

Second, after 9:55 p.m., with one exception from 11:15 p.m. to 11:35 p.m., trains departed Meadowlands Station every eight to thirteen minutes. These departure times were consistent regardless of the method used to move passengers through Pavilion 6 or the timing of passengers entering and exiting Pavilion 6. From 9:55 p.m. until the last fully loaded train departed at 12:50 a.m., NJ TRANSIT transported just over 31,000 passengers, an average of over 10,600 passengers per hour. At its peak, NJ TRANSIT transported over 12,600 passengers between 10:18 p.m. and 11:15 p.m.

Third, we were unable to determine the cause of the twenty minute delay from 11:15 p.m. to 11:35 p.m. NJ TRANSIT did not report any equipment issues during the egress process. The 11:35 p.m. train departed from Platform 1 and began loading at 11:11 p.m. with passengers released from the side of Pavilion 6 along West Peripheral Road. After those passengers were on the platform, passengers began exiting Pavilion 6 to Platform 1 at 11:14 p.m. As with all trains departing the Super Bowl, the train was loaded from the farthest end of the platform (the front of a departing train) to the rear of the platform near Pavilion 6. At approximately 11:22 p.m., passengers began entering the two rear cars. At the same time, a large group of passengers
continued down the platform towards the front of the train, rather than loading at the rear of the train.

By 11:27 p.m., passengers finished entering Platform 1. It is not clear from the video footage why the last large group of passengers entering Platform 1 continued to the farthest end of the platform. At 11:30 p.m., a smaller group of passengers walked back down Platform 1 and was redirected to another platform. Since the group that walked back down the platform at 11:30 p.m. was significantly smaller than the group that continued towards the front of the train, it is possible that the front cars were under-loaded, and passengers were directed to the front of the platform to fill those cars. Given the length of the platform and number of passengers involved, this could have caused a delay of several minutes. An additional five to ten minutes of passengers walking the length of the platform and loading onto the train at the end of the loading process could have resulted in a twenty minute gap between departures rather than the eight to thirteen minute departure rate that was achieved during the rest of egress.

According to the data provided by NJ TRANSIT, the 11:35 p.m. train departed with 1,343 passengers. Several trains ran that night with higher passenger loads; it therefore is unclear why some passengers were unable to board the train and were required to walk back down the platform and be redirected to another train. The passengers exited the platform at 11:32 p.m., and the train departed approximately three minutes later. Regardless of these events, the delay was minor—at most a twelve minute delay had the train departed at on an eight minute headway—and the delay did not impact the loading and departure of the subsequent train, which departed five minutes later at 11:40 p.m.
Finally, after 9:55 p.m., trains departed Meadowlands Station on an average of every 10.3 minutes, including the twenty-minute gap discussed above. Historically, trains departing Meadowlands Station during peak egress depart on an average of between six and eight minutes, depending on the event. However, that shorter, historic average is based on events using smaller trains with a smaller capacity of approximately 800 passengers. NJ TRANSIT achieved a 10.3 minute average departure time with trains loaded above seated capacity—a significant number of which departed with more than 1,600 passengers—double the capacity of the trains normally used to achieve a six to eight minute average. Despite the lines and wait times, the early confusion in Pavilion 6, and the time needed to take corrective action, NJ TRANSIT loaded almost all trains to above seated capacity, running on an average of 10.3 minute headways, without any reported injuries, incidents, or equipment failures.

Due to system constraints, had there been no issues encountered on egress, NJ TRANSIT would have still needed between two and a half and three hours to move the post-game crowd by rail. Here, it took three and a half hours. Considering the crowd exceeded estimates by more than 20,000 passengers, the efforts of all involved to move more than 35,000 transit riders safely and efficiently out of MetLife Stadium should be commended. In the end, safety was achieved; perfect efficiency was not.

5. **Super Bowl Egress - Bus**

   a. **Buses Are Deployed at MetLife Stadium**

   With the crowd building in the train queuing area, the Governor’s Chief Counsel, Christopher Porrino learned of the backup and the expectation that it would take between two and a half and three hours to move guests by train. Porrino, then called on-site officials for an
In a short call, Executive Director Weinstein described the rationale for not using the emergency bus reserves at MetLife Stadium. About thirty minutes later, Porrino called Executive Director Weinstein again. Commissioner Simpson was also on the call. This time, Porrino strongly urged Executive Director Weinstein to activate bus service at MetLife stadium. As soon as the call ended, Executive Director Weinstein ordered 100 buses be immediately deployed to MetLife Stadium.

b. **Buses Arrive at MetLife Stadium**

At around 11:25 p.m., NJ TRANSIT buses arrived at MetLife Stadium. Per the bus contingency plan, the buses lined up along the West Peripheral Road parallel to the train tracks. The buses were stacked in single file with the doors facing the curb.
The first two buses were loaded one at a time and headed out at 11:32 p.m. and 11:34 p.m. respectively. The next two buses were loaded simultaneously at 11:35 p.m. and departed at 11:41 p.m. In the next wave, five buses were loaded at the same time and exited within seven minutes. Passengers boarded one last bus from this area at approximately 11:59 p.m. The remaining buses were then diverted from West Peripheral Road to Lot E of the Meadowlands parking lot.

We were told that the passenger loading area was moved at the direction of the NJSP. The NJSP considered the parking lot to be a safer loading zone than West Peripheral Road. Although use of West Peripheral Road had been part of the detailed Bus Operations Playbook for months, the NJSP advised us that it was not made privy to those plans in advance and had no opportunity to review them for public safety concerns. Despite the NJSP’s concerns, Joyce Gallagher, then Director of Bus Operations was against changing operations midstream because it would be difficult to coordinate a new plan with the bus drivers and she did not perceive any
safety issues loading passengers curbside along West Peripheral Road. She strongly voiced her objections, and according to Gallagher, the NJSP threatened to arrest her if she continued to protest. She later resumed discussions with the NJSP and Commissioner Simpson inside Pavilion 6; however, the buses were already being re-routed.

At approximately 12:01 a.m., the buses entered Lot E. As there was no advance plan to use this lot, the loading operations were put together on the spot. According to Joyce Gallagher, the NJSP controlled passenger loading and crowd flow in the parking lot. Passengers interested in direct bus service to the Port Authority Bus Terminal in New York were relocated from the Pavilion 6 area to the pavilion abutting the parking lot. Buses lined up single file in a circular pattern to load passengers.

Buses were first loaded two at a time. After about fifteen minutes, as more buses entered the parking lot, the buses were stacked in two columns and loaded four at a time.
Because the doors were facing away from the curb, the passengers needed to walk around the bus to board, thereby slowing down the loading process.

The last bus was loaded around 12:45 a.m. Between 12:01 a.m. and 12:45 a.m., a total of approximately thirty buses were loaded in Lot E. After the last bus was loaded, the remaining
empty buses began leaving the parking lot. By 12:52 a.m., the lot was clear. A total of 1,867 passengers were transported by bus from MetLife Stadium to the Port Authority Bus Terminal in New York. It took approximately one hour and fifteen minutes to load these passengers.

6. Total Egress Volume and Time

In total, NJ TRANSIT safely moved 35,264 passengers out of MetLife Stadium. NJ TRANSIT rail transported 33,397 guests from Meadowlands Station to Secaucus Junction, and NJ TRANSIT bus transported another 1,867 guests from MetLife Stadium to Port Authority Bus Terminal in New York, roughly 7,000 passengers, or twenty-five percent, more out-bound passengers than in-bound.

It took approximately three hours and thirty minutes to transport the vast majority of these passengers. The first heavy volume train (1,410 passengers) departed at 9:22 p.m.—leaving approximately thirty minutes before the game ended. The last heavy volume train (1,650 passengers) left MetLife Stadium at 12:50 a.m. By 1:05 a.m., the final NJ TRANSIT train left Meadowlands Station carrying only thirty-two passengers. In contrast, the MetLife Stadium parking lots were clear by approximately 11:15 p.m.

Unlike Meadowlands Station, there was no reported back-up at Secaucus Junction in the post-game period. Extra trains helped efficiently move passengers through Secaucus Junction to their destination. Indeed, once a NY Penn Station bound passenger boarded a train at Meadowlands Station it took approximately forty-five to sixty minutes for that passenger to reach NY Penn Station.
7. Unused Parking Passes Skew Rail Demand Estimates

The inaccurate ridership predictions appear to have been driven, in large part, by the significant number of parking passes that were sold but not actually used on game day. In calculating expected train ridership, SP+ Gameday used parking pass and shuttle sales figures to estimate the number of guests traveling by other modes of transportation, such as car, bus, or limo. The high cost of parking passes ($150 - $350) created a reasonable presumption that most purchased parking passes would be used.

As it turned out across all vehicle classes, only 6,057 vehicles parked as compared to 8,712 vehicles being allocated parking spaces. The following chart breaks this information down in further detail:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vehicle Type</th>
<th>Allocated</th>
<th>Parked</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Estimated Fan Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Car/Van/SUV</td>
<td>6814</td>
<td>4709</td>
<td>-2105</td>
<td>6315 (assumption 3 fans per car)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>1386</td>
<td>1015</td>
<td>-371</td>
<td>14840 (assumption 40 fans per bus)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limo</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>-122</td>
<td>1220 (assumption 10 fans per limo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mini-Bus</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>-57</td>
<td>855 (assumption 15 fans per mini bus)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS:</td>
<td>8712</td>
<td>6057</td>
<td>-2655</td>
<td>23230</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using SP+ Gameday’s load factors, this smaller than expected vehicle turnout appears to have led to approximately 23,000 fewer fans traveling to the game by car, bus or limo. It is a safe assumption that the bulk of these fans rode the train instead, contributing to a large portion of the unexpected rail volume. Indeed, Mike Witte of SP+ Gameday observed that “[t]he statistics highlight the parking permit ‘no shows’ which of course resulted in the unprecedented, record setting, NJ TRANSIT train ridership.”
While we do not know with any certainty why so many parking passes went unused, we heard during our interviews several theories that may have played a factor:

a. **Lackluster Vehicle for Hire Demand**

We understand that many travel companies and hotels sold Super Bowl packages that included game tickets, accommodations and transportation to and from the game. Other transportation companies sold Super Bowl party bus, limousine and charter bus packages. As of June 2014, some of these advertisements can still be found with an internet search. We were told that companies typically buy passes in anticipation of selling game or luxury transportation packages. Lack of demand for these packages may have contributed to the lower than expected bus, limo and mini-bus turnout.

The NFL followed up with its two largest bus pass purchasers on whether they intended to use all of their passes and adjusted their sales accordingly. The NFL, however, generally did not verify that parking pass purchasers intended to use the passes. Moreover, purchasers could not return unneeded parking passes. Therefore, there was little visibility into whether purchased passes would be used.

b. **Secondary Market Sales**

As is customary with sporting event tickets, people may have purchased parking passes with the intent to resell them rather than use them. Parking passes went on sale weeks before the Super Bowl team matchup was known; parking passes were sold separate from tickets. Thus, there was no guarantee that ticketholders, in the first instance, bought the parking passes. If the secondary resale market was softer than anticipated, resellers may have been stuck holding parking passes. Nevertheless, the NFL indicated that it receives Super Bowl parking pass
inquiries several months in advance of a game, and it holds off on selling the parking passes as long as it can. The NFL also indicated that it has measures in place to try to ensure that parking passes are not purchased by re-sellers, such as reviewing transaction names and addresses to avoid bulk purchases.

c. **Lower Actual Loads**

There is no precise data showing the total number of guests traveling in the vehicles that parked on-site. Such data is difficult to obtain and would have required a labor-intensive manual count or post-event survey. Instead of performing such a costly and inefficient exercise, transportation analysts generally rely on assumed load factors by vehicle class in performing pre- or post-event estimates. Here, SP+ Gameday projected three fans per car, forty fans per charter bus, ten fans per limo, and fifteen fans per mini-bus. This technique, however, only provides an estimate. If the average number of people in any vehicle class ended up being even slightly different than the assumed load, it may have skewed the estimates. For example, if the 1,015 charter buses parking on-site carried an average of just five passengers less than the assumed load, this would have meant approximately 5,000 people expected to ride the bus opted for a different form of transportation. Anecdotally, we heard that some charter buses may not have carried full capacity. In any event, the use of a load factor, while standard and reasonable, introduces uncertainty into estimates.

A final variable that likely impacted train ridership was fewer guests riding the NFL Fan Express and other shuttles than estimated. Early on, the NFL Fan Express targeted ridership was 12,000 to 13,000 passengers. Leading up to game day, the projection was lowered to 5,498 passengers—more than fifty percent less than early projections. In the end, actual ridership
did not meet this reduced expectation, falling short by 1,308 riders. Overall, across the different shuttle types, there were 3,633 fewer shuttle riders than estimated.

**Ridership difference on Shuttles**

- NFL Fan Express - 1,308 less riders
- NFL Friends & Family - 603 less riders
- Media Shuttle - 151 less riders
- NFL Sponsorship Tailgate Buses - 631 less riders
- AFC Team Family - 47 less riders
- NFC Team Family - 82 less riders
- Staff Shuttle - 811 less riders

**Total - 3,633 less riders**

These guests instead either chose not to attend the game or took another form of transportation.
V. LESSONS LEARNED

Under the circumstances, NJ TRANSIT performed admirably on Super Bowl Sunday. Based on estimates from the NFL and its own analysis, NJ TRANSIT was expecting to transport between 8,000 and 13,000 fans to and from the game—a typical football crowd and well within system capacity. Instead, NJ TRANSIT faced a record pre-game crowd of 28,031 fans and an even more daunting crowd of 35,264 fans after the game. As a public entity and the only unreserved transportation option with no limit on ticket sales, NJ TRANSIT met this challenge head-on.

System capacity for Meadowlands Station is approximately 13,000 passengers per hour. Without costly infrastructure improvements, little can be done to materially increase capacity. Trains can be overloaded, but this comes with attendant safety issues, and increased loading time. Any benefit by the increased passenger count may largely be offset by decreased turnaround time. Moving at the maximum capacity of 13,000 passengers per hour, the rail system could transport 35,264 passengers in approximately two and a half to three hours. As can be expected when dealing with such a large crowd, NJ TRANSIT encountered some difficulties along the way that prevented it from reaching its passenger-per-hour target. Even with these glitches, NJ TRANSIT safely moved the Super Bowl crowd in three and a half hours.

As part of this review, we sought constructive feedback on the cause of the glitches as well as advice on better handling the next large volume event. We include our own observations, not as criticism, but as “lessons learned” to improve future performance and the overall customer experience.
A. Contingency Planning for Unexpected Demand

For a variety of reasons, there will be times when Meadowlands Station rail demand exceeds expectations and exceeds system capacity. It happened in 2009 for the U2 concerts and again for the Super Bowl. NJ TRANSIT may not have advance warning the next time it happens, but NJ TRANSIT can learn from the Super Bowl experience to have more options in place to address demand variations. Without the overlay of a SEAR-1 event and the Super Bowl itself, reacting to the unexpected may be less complicated.

As part of the Super Bowl planning, NJ TRANSIT considered some of its options and developed a bus contingency plan as a last resort in case of rail service disruptions or extreme crowding. But the plan, as ultimately implemented, was only capable of moving approximately 2,500 passengers per hour. Even if the plan had been activated at halftime, it would not have shaved more than fifteen to thirty minutes off the total egress time. And, had rail service become unavailable for an extended period, the back-up bus plan was incapable of efficiently moving 35,264 guests out of MetLife Stadium.

While we expect the operation to run more efficiently with the return of NJ TRANSIT operations, NJTPD, NJSEA and the NJSP to their accustomed roles, NJ TRANSIT should consider options to move people faster by bus in the event of a rail disruption, extreme crowding or other emergency. For the Super Bowl, the bus plan was limited by the available geography of an expanded security perimeter. NJ TRANSIT was only given space along West Peripheral Road and Route 120 to conduct emergency bus operations as the parking lots were designated for other purposes. At best, NJ TRANSIT had enough room to load ten buses curbside at a time at each location, with necessarily limited capacity.
Going forward, NJ TRANSIT should explore options for a larger emergency loading zone. Future events may not have the same geographic constraints as the Super Bowl, which may lead to better alternatives. We were advised by the Bus Operations team that arranging buses in a saw tooth pattern in an empty parking lot could allow up to twenty buses to be loaded at once. Doing so would result in about 1,000 passengers being loaded every ten minutes. This method also permits a bus to pull out as soon as it is full rather than wait for the buses in front of it to load and go—as is necessary when the buses are lined up front to back. A sample diagram of a saw tooth pattern is set forth below:
Conceptually, even more buses could be loaded at a time given a larger area. NJ TRANSIT has the experience and knowledge to determine the right balance so the buses do not cause traffic problems and slow down the process.

On this issue, we explored with NJ TRANSIT the idea of limiting train ticket sales for MetLife Stadium events to avoid excessive demand. As a public transportation agency, NJ TRANSIT viewed this option as inconsistent with its public mandate and undesirable from a policy and operational perspective.

B. Advanced Coordination with Law Enforcement

The NJSP was not expected to have an active role in passenger loading on Super Bowl Sunday. Like regular MetLife Stadium events, the NJSP was charged with providing safety and security services in the area surrounding the station and platform. As the day developed, however, the NJSP intervened in the train and bus loading processes to address perceived safety concerns.

For all involved, the safety of Super Bowl attendees was the first, and most important, priority. Despite this overarching and common goal, the NJSP was not part of the transit planning process. As a result, the NJSP was not intimately involved on such things as the rail passenger queuing system or the use of West Peripheral Road as an emergency bus loading zone. Had the NJSP been more actively involved with the planning, there would have been an opportunity to vet and ameliorate any safety concerns well before game day, allowing for a more measured review of operational issues and reducing the likelihood of unplanned, midstream adjustments. In the future, NJ TRANSIT should consider involving law enforcement agencies in
its transit planning for major events and ensure that all on-site law enforcement is aware of its transit plans.

C. Better Coordination with NFL Contractors on the Egress Queuing Process

Super Bowl XLVIII was a meticulously planned event. Years of work went into every detail, including public transportation. To that end, NJ TRANSIT, NJSEA, and Party Planner’s West collaborated on a written egress queuing system. It resembled the system used during regular MetLife Stadium events but inserted NFL contractors in the place of NJSEA personnel.\textsuperscript{186} It also required departing guests to pass back through Pavilion 6—a physical barrier not present during normal events.

With these personnel and physical differences from a regular event, a written plan was essential. To implement the plan, the field personnel tasked with doing so needed to flesh out details and arrive at a common understanding of their respective roles. Some of the details not addressed in the written plan that needed to be worked out, included:

- \textit{How to determine the number of people in the pavilion?} According to the written plan, the pavilion and each secondary pen was supposed to be filled with a trainload of passengers—roughly 1,300. In the beginning, the people entering the pavilion were counted, which impacted the speed of entry. Later, the counting was abandoned and the number of people was visually estimated.

- \textit{How to arrange the people inside the pavilion?} For regular events, people are grouped in pens \textit{en masse} and not arranged in any particular order. However, the pens are smaller than the Super Bowl pavilions and designed to fit exactly a trainload of people. For the Super Bowl, the written plan stated that there “will NOT be any queue lines or pens set inside the Pavilions (allowing guests to flow freely throughout)” but “[t]here will be barricades at the side walls of the tents to be used during out-bound operations, if necessary.” There did not seem to be any common understanding or general consensus regarding the best way to arrange guests as different methods were tried. For example, throughout the egress, attempts were made, at various times, to set up queue lines with
barricades. However, there were no pre-planned locations for barricade placement resulting in more of a trial by error approach.

- **Location and usage of secondary pens.** The written egress plan contemplated grouping passengers in three pens—the platform, the pavilion and the area to the exterior of Pavilion 6. As contemplated, guests would rotate from one pen to the next and then onto the train. By setting up a pen outside the pavilion, there would have been no need to count or estimate the number of guests entering the pavilion because this would have already been done in forming the exterior pen. However, no secondary pen was used outside of Pavilion 6.

- **Which pavilion doors should be used for entry into and exit from the pavilion?** The use of pavilions introduced a new element into the egress process. As such, there were no established protocols on how to efficiently move people through this closed physical structure. People needed to enter and exit the pavilion through typical sized doorways. Not all doors were used at the beginning of the process. As the egress progressed, all doors were opened increasing passenger flow.

Having not resolved these issues in advance, it took some time for the field staff to efficiently queue and load passengers. From our interviews and video review, we observed that the egress process started to develop a rhythm and flow after about an hour. In that one hour period, however, the queuing area significantly backed-up. With the heavy volume of passengers, this was unavoidable, but passengers could have been transported with shorter delays had the rhythm developed sooner. While NJ TRANSIT, NJSEA and NFL contractors engaged in high-level planning and discussions regarding the egress process, there appears to have been less advance coordination between the field staff of these respective entities, although we understand there was a walk-through on the Friday before the game where NJSEA reviewed the queuing plan.

In the future, if there are going to be significant staff or physical changes in the egress process, the field personnel should coordinate in detail on how they are going to address the
changes. Pre-event meetings, walk-throughs and communication can help define roles and develop a common approach. This may, in turn, reduce any learning curves and result in a more efficient process.

D. Improved Public Communication of Capacity

As the “First Mass Transit Super Bowl,” fans were encouraged to take buses or trains to the stadium with the expectation that public transportation could comfortably accommodate all comers. In reality, the rail system can only move approximately 13,000 people per hour. As the Super Bowl demonstrated, guests will encounter substantial wait times if the crowd greatly exceeds this hourly capacity.

With expected rail ridership hovering around 8,000 to 12,000 people, there was little reason to publicize system limitations in advance; however, organizers were well aware of the limits. Once the unprecedented demand became clear, NJ TRANSIT should have guided customer expectations. Indeed, NJ TRANSIT embraced social media for the Super Bowl. On ingress, it broadcast ridership totals virtually in real time. It supplied helpful information and answered guest questions on Twitter throughout the day. Guests should have been advised of the impact of the record ridership totals on expected wait times through all available means: social media, traditional media, signage at Secaucus Junction and at MetLife Stadium and announcements over the stadium public address system and screens.

This would not have materially reduced train ridership but certainly would have helped passengers adjust their expectations, control their anxiety and tailor their frustrations. Guests would have been given the opportunity to consider revising their egress strategy by either leaving earlier to beat the crowd or waiting in their seats to allow the crowd to diminish.
E. Minimize Physical Obstacles

The pavilions introduced a physical variable into the passenger loading process. For the Super Bowl, due to security concerns, train riders were required to undergo security screening in a large tent at the bottom of the train platform. After the game, passengers had to pass through the same tent to get back to the platform. Entering and exiting the tent created two separate bottlenecks that slowed passenger movement. Normally, there are no physical obstacles at the base of the train platform impeding passenger movement. During regular events, guests are not required to funnel through a tent. Instead, the open queuing area is wide enough to allow about fifteen guests to walk side by side. This creates a much freer passenger flow and speeds the loading process.

The loading process was further impacted because Pavilion 6, as a closed structure, blocked the workers’ line of sight. For a regular event, NJSEA staff operating the queuing line can see onto the platform. By observing the loading process, they can anticipate when the next cluster of guests should move onto the platform. They can also communicate with NJ TRANSIT and NJTPD personnel on the platform with hand signals. With a few simple hand gestures, they know when to release passengers and to which platform they should be sent. In contrast, during the Super Bowl, the personnel outside the pavilion could not see inside it. This led to discomfort and delays, as there were periods when guests were neither exiting nor entering the pavilion, and the perimeter personnel could not see to determine the cause or provide assistance in alleviating the delay.

The primary function of the pavilions was to provide a secure area for in-bound security screenings—something not required for a regular event. The pavilions were also designed with
the customer experience in mind, offering a comfortable guest environment protected from the elements. Because it was never anticipated that over 30,000 people would need to pass through the pavilion on egress, passenger flow considerations for that size crowd were not factored into the design. Larger doors and translucent walls would have helped. In any event, the placement of physical obstacles near the base of the train platform should be minimized so there is no substantial impact on the train loading process.

F. Consistency of Personnel

Throughout our interviews, we heard a common theme: regular events run smoothly because many of the same people from NJ TRANSIT, NJTPD, NJSEA and the NJSP work these events year after year. With this experience and consistency, the team has built an outstanding camaraderie and a sense of mutual respect and familiarity with one another. They have also developed a unique expertise with the facility and the associated crowd flow patterns.

For the Super Bowl, this successful mix was changed. NJ TRANSIT and NJTPD personnel remained constant, but some of NJSEA’s customary duties were assigned to S.A.F.E. NJSEA nevertheless still stationed seasoned executives at the platform to help. However, early in the post-game process, they felt their suggestions were largely ignored because “they never worked a Super Bowl.” The NJSP, while assuming its familiar role, was led inside Pavilion 6 by a Sergeant who never worked a MetLife event. The pavilion—also something new to the mix—was manned by the NFL and its contractors. Taken together, these changes introduced uncertainty into an ordinarily crisp, efficient process.

Under the best conditions, there naturally would be a learning curve as newcomers learned the site peculiarities and to work together. Under extreme conditions, like facing an
unforeseen, record crowd, the learning curve becomes even steeper. In light of the circumstances, glitches, especially early in the process, were to be expected. The glitches, however, may have been minimized to some degree with more experienced personnel. Once the steady and experienced hands of James Minish and Captain Mark Mangan took control of the pavilion queuing process, a rhythm developed. Going forward, maintaining staff continuity for high profile events should be a priority. Experience can be invaluable tool in dealing with the unexpected.

1 NJ TRANSIT, Minutes of Board of Directors Meeting 9 (Feb. 24, 2014).
2 Id.
7 Id. § 27:25-2(a).
8 Id. § 27:25-5(h).
11 See About Us, supra note 9.


14 Id. The eighth member is not “considered in determining a quorum.” Id.

15 Id. § 27:25-4(d).

16 Id. § 27:25-4(a).


19 Id.

20 See Transit Police, supra note 17.


22 Id.

23 Id.

24 Acting Commissioner New Jersey Department of Transportation, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, http://www.state.nj.us/transportation/about/commissioner/ (last updated June 16, 2014).


[33] Id.

[34] Id.


[37] Id.


40 Id.


43 Id.

44 Id.


46 Id.

47 Id.


49 E-mail from Adam Otsuku, Rail Operations Planner, NJ TRANSIT, to Thomas Morgan, Director of Rail Service Planning, NJ TRANSIT (Sept. 24, 2009, 3:14 PM).

50 Id.

51 Mascarenhas, supra note 45.

52 See Letter from Alvin Ricardo Little, supra note 3.

53 Mascarenhas, supra note 45.

54 Id.
E-mail from Jack DiSarro, Principal Planner-Rail Service, NJ TRANSIT, to Thomas Morgan, Director of Rail Service Planning, NJ TRANSIT (Sept. 24, 2009, 11:22 AM).

As per Richard Andreski, Rail Operations Chief of Staff since 2009, NJ TRANSIT continued to operate in this manner for most Meadowlands events including the Super Bowl.


Id.

Id.

Id.

Id.


Id.

Id.

Id.


Id.

Id.

Id.


Id.


Id.

Id.


Id.


Id.

See Rouse, supra note 72.


*Id.* at 5.

*Id.* at 15.

*Id.* at 10.

*Id.* at 17.

*Id.* at 25.

*Id.* at 30.

*Id.* at Annex A – Risk Register.

*Id.*

Memorandum from James Weinstein, Executive Director, NJ TRANSIT, on NJ TRANSIT Service Contingencies for Super Bowl XLVIII to Wayne Hasenbalg, President and CEO, NJ Sports and Exposition Authority (Jan. 16, 2014) [hereinafter Weinstein Memo].

*Id.* at 5.

See, e.g., e-mail from Mike Witte, Managing Director – Event Operations, SP+ Gameday, to Richard Andreski, Rail Operations Chief of Staff, NJ TRANSIT (Dec. 20, 2013, 3:14 PM); E-mail from Mike Witte, Managing Director – Event Operations, SP+ Gameday, to Richard Andreski, Rail Operations Chief of Staff, NJ TRANSIT (Jan. 29, 2014, 3:21 PM).

See, e.g., e-mail from Pat Ryan, President, Party Planners West, Inc., to Richard Andreski, Rail Operations Chief of Staff, NJ TRANSIT (Aug. 19, 2013, 6:21 PM).

See, e.g., e-mail from Gary Davies, Vice President, Transportation Engineering and Planning, AECOM Transportation, to Richard Andreski, Rail Operations Chief of Staff, NJ TRANSIT (July 24, 2013, 10:20 AM) (forwarding e-mail from Gary Davies to Marcos Diaz-Gonzalez).


N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:10-1 et seq.


See Populous, Super Bowl XLVIII Game Day Facilities Plan (Oct. 11, 2013).

E-mail from Mike Witte, Managing Director – Event Operations, SP+ Gameday, to Richard Andreski, Rail Operations Chief of Staff, NJ TRANSIT (Jan. 22, 2014, 11:34 AM).


Id.


Id.


Id.


E-mail from Mike Witte, Managing Director – Event Operations, SP+ Gameday, to Richard Andreski, Rail Operations Chief of Staff, NJ TRANSIT (Dec. 20, 2013, 3:14 PM).
SP+ Gameday provided the following rail passenger estimates:

1. May 6, 2013 – 10,000 rail passengers (E-mail from Mike Witte, Managing Director – Event Operations, SP+ Gameday, to Dennis Motiani, Super Bowl Transportation Committee Co-Chair (May 6, 2013, 1:01 PM)).

2. October 17, 2013 – 10,000 rail passengers (Memorandum from Bernie Alpern, AECOM Transportation, on Super Bowl Sunday Rail Demand and Queuing Analysis to Richard Andreski, Rail Operations Chief of Staff, NJ TRANSIT 2 (Dec. 12, 2013) (citing numbers presented by Mike Witte at Oct. 17, 2013 Table Top exercise)).

3. January 6, 2014 – 10,828 rail passengers (E-mail from John Festin, SP+ Gameday, to Richard Andreski, Rail Operations Chief of Staff, NJ TRANSIT (Jan. 6, 2014, 7:55 AM)).

4. January 22, 2014 – 8,000 rail passengers (E-mail from Mike Witte, Managing Director – Event Operations, SP+ Gameday, to Richard Andreski, Rail Operations Chief of Staff, NJ TRANSIT (Jan. 22, 2014, 11:22 AM)).

5. January 25, 2014 – 8,000 rail passengers (E-mail from Mike Witte, Managing Director – Event Operations, SP+ Gameday, to Richard Andreski, Rail Operations Chief of Staff, NJ TRANSIT (Jan. 26, 2014, 4:39 PM)).

6. January 29, 2014 – 8,000 rail passengers (E-mail from Mike Witte, Managing Director – Event Operations, SP+ Gameday, to Richard Andreski, Rail Operations Chief of Staff, NJ TRANSIT (Jan. 29, 2014, 3:21 PM)).

7. January 30, 2014 – 8,000 rail passengers (E-mail from Mike Witte, Managing Director – Event Operations, SP+ Gameday, to Richard Andreski, Rail Operations Chief of Staff, NJ TRANSIT (Jan. 31, 2014, 7:17 PM)).

8. January 31, 2014 – 8,000 rail passengers (E-mail from Mike Witte, Managing Director – Event Operations, SP+ Gameday, to Richard Andreski, Rail Operations Chief of Staff, NJ TRANSIT (Jan. 31, 2014, 8:22 PM)).

During the week of the Super Bowl, based on the sale of parking passes, NJ TRANSIT’s estimated rail ridership was higher than SP+ Gameday’s estimates due to the difference in load.

119 E-mail from Gary Davies, Vice President, Transportation Engineering and Planning, AECOM Transportation, to Richard Andreski, Rail Operations Chief of Staff, NJ TRANSIT (Feb. 12, 2013, 4:52 PM).

120 Id.

121 E-mail from Gary Davies, Vice President, Transportation Engineering and Planning, AECOM Transportation, to Mary Musca, NY/NJ Super Bowl Host Committee Member (Aug. 12, 2013, 5:19 PM).

122 E-mail from Gary Davies, Vice President, Transportation Engineering and Planning, AECOM Transportation, to Richard Andreski, Rail Operations Chief of Staff, NJ TRANSIT (Aug. 13, 2013, 11:10 AM).

123 Memorandum from Bernie Alpern, AECOM Transportation, on Super Bowl Sunday Rail Demand and Queuing Analysis to Richard Andreski, Rail Operations Chief of Staff, NJ TRANSIT 2, 4-6 (Dec. 12, 2013).

124 NJ TRANSIT, Super Bowl XLVIII Estimated Pre-Game Transportation to MetLife Stadium on 2/2/14 (Jan 31, 2014, 8:00 PM).

125 NJ TRANSIT, Minutes of Executive Policy Group/EOC Conference Call (Feb. 2, 2014, 11:00 AM).


128 See id. for Super Bowl XLVIII campus layout and security perimeter location.

129 Id.


The full extent of the security measures are outside the scope of this report and have not been detailed. We have only discussed those aspects of the security mechanisms that may have had an impact on crowd movement.

136 This was a variation from the regular pathway for guests going through the mezzanine level.

137 Prior to 2:15 p.m., the platform crowding was far less severe.

138 See, e.g., NJ TRANSIT, TWITTER, (Feb. 2, 2014, 2:01 PM), http://twitter.com/NJTRANSIT/statuses/430053445648019456 (“We have alerted stations regarding the temperature.”); NJ TRANSIT, TWITTER, (Feb. 2, 2014, 2:10 PM) http://twitter.com/NJTRANSIT/statuses/430055707975897088 (“we hear you, stations has [sic] turned up the ac & trains continue to boars/leave for stadium”); NJ TRANSIT, TWITTER, (Feb. 2, 2014, 2:13 PM) http://twitter.com/NJTRANSIT/statuses/430056455245672449 (“We understand about the heat. We are having our team look into it. Please hang tight!”); NJ TRANSIT, TWITTER, (Feb. 2, 2014, 2:15 PM) http://twitter.com/NJTRANSIT/statuses/430056938005860352 (We’ve alerted the station re: the heat. Pls understand there are lots of fans and we’re trying to load trains quickly.”); NJ TRANSIT, TWITTER, (Feb. 2, 2014, 2:19 PM) http://twitter.com/NJTRANSIT/statuses/430057951421034496 (“We hear you. AC has been turned up in #Secaucus -- pls understand trains to the game are loading every 10 minutes.”); NJ TRANSIT, TWITTER, (Feb. 2, 2014, 2:28 PM) http://twitter.com/NJTRANSIT/statuses/430060245373956096 (“We’ve turned up the AC but there are lots of fans trying to board the first few game trains.”); NJ TRANSIT, TWITTER, (Feb. 2, 2014, 2:48 PM) http://twitter.com/NJTRANSIT/statuses/43006133722025985 (“We understand. AC is up & loading trains as quickly as possible. Pls alert nearest ambassador/security if someone sick.”).


141 E-mail from Richard Andreski, Rail Operations Chief of Staff, NJ TRANSIT, to Daphne Wood, Pavilion 6 Captain, NFL (Feb. 2, 2014, 3:32 PM).


143 NJ TRANSIT, TWITTER, (Feb. 2, 2014, 5:04 PM), http://twitter.com/NJTRANSIT/statuses/430099397683466240 (“there have been no confirmed reports of fans passing out in the station.”).


148 Preliminary Transportation Plan, supra note 80, at 32.

149 Id.

150 Weinstein Memo, supra note 95, at 5.


152 Preliminary Transportation Plan, supra note 80, at 40.

153 Id. at 43.

154 Weinstein Memo, supra note 95, at 5.

155 Bus Playbook, supra note 151, at Tab 7.

156 During peak travel time, the number of stand-by buses was as follows: 4:00 p.m. (300 buses), 5:00 p.m. (340 buses), 6:00 p.m. (370 buses), 7:00 p.m. (370 buses), 8:00 p.m. (340 buses), 9:00 p.m. (310 buses), 10:00 p.m. (310 buses), 11:00 p.m. (310 buses), 12:00 a.m. (300 buses). These
figures include both NJ TRANSIT and private carrier buses that were at NJ TRANSIT’s disposal. See id. (Stand-By Buses for SB 48 (v2) chart).


E-mail from Gary Davies, Vice President, Transportation Engineering and Planning, AECOM Transportation, to Richard Andreski, Rail Operations Chief of Staff, NJ TRANSIT (July 24, 2013, 10:20 AM) (forwarding e-mail from Gary Davies to Marcos Diaz-Gonzalez).

Id.

Id.

Id.

NJ TRANSIT, Minutes of Executive Policy Group/EOC Conference Call (Feb. 2, 2014, 6:00 PM).

Along this peripheral roadway, NJ TRANSIT had enough room to load ten buses at a time. NJ TRANSIT could transport up to 500 passengers with each wave of ten buses (each bus held fifty passengers). With buses stacked at the ready, we were told a load-and-go operation could move five to six bus cycles per hour. See NJ TRANSIT, Super Bowl Contingency Operations, MetLife Stadium to New York – Port Authority Bus Terminal (Microsoft Excel spreadsheet) [hereinafter Bus Movement Spreadsheet].

NJ TRANSIT advised us that it did not have a count of the number of people at Secaucus Junction at any one time during the ingress process.

Weinstein Memo, supra note 95, at 5.

N.J.S.A. 27:25-4 establishes New Jersey Transit Corporation and allocates it within the Department of Transportation. Subsection (a) states that despite that allocation, NJ TRANSIT “shall be independent of any supervision or control by the department [of transportation] or by any body or officer thereof.”

See e-mail from Pat Ryan, President, Party Planners West, Inc., to Richard Andreski, Rail Operations Chief of Staff, NJ TRANSIT (Aug. 20, 2013 01:38 PM EST), for a description of the Super Bowl XLVIII egress loading plan.
The videos show that, throughout the egress process, passengers waiting along West Peripheral Road were released in coordination with when passengers were exiting Pavilion 6, ensuring that passengers were not entering the platform from both Pavilion 6 and West Peripheral Road at the same time. This coordination appears to have allowed the trains to be filled beyond seated capacity while ensuring the two crowds did not blend together, thus making it easier to track the number of passengers entering the platform.

NJ TRANSIT, Ridership – Super Bowl XLVIII (2014) (table of per train ridership to and from Meadowlands Station).

Between 2:48 p.m. and 8:52 p.m., trains departed MetLife Stadium approximately every hour, carrying light loads ranging from fourteen passengers (3:48 p.m.) to 480 passengers (8:52 p.m.).

Two more trains departed after the 12:50 a.m. train, carrying a total of forty-four passengers.

SP+ Gameday, Super Bowl XLVIII MetLife Stadium Transport Summary AAR (table summary of parking and systems ridership).

The number of allocated parking spaces in the post-game parking breakdown is higher than the email estimates because the post-game breakdown captures the entire number of parking passes, which includes publicly available spaces, parking passes for the Host Committee party at the Racetrack, last minute staff parking needs, and law enforcement and emergency services permits. The email estimates only captured publicly available permits.

E-mail from Mike Witte, Managing Director – Event Operations, SP+ Gameday, to Mary Musca, NY/NJ Super Bowl Host Committee Member (Feb. 10, 2014, 5:15 PM).

E-mail from Daphne Wood, Pavilion 6 Captain, NFL, to Louise Monroe, Super Bowl XLVIII Program Support, NJ TRANSIT (Dec. 16, 2013, 11:08 AM).
See E-mail from Mike Witte, Managing Director – Event Operations, SP+ Gameday, to Richard Andreski, Rail Operations Chief of Staff, NJ TRANSIT (Jan. 31, 2014, 8:22 PM).

See Bus Movement Spreadsheet, supra note 163. In any event, NJ TRANSIT moved 1,867 passengers in one hour and fifteen minutes—a pace of 1493.6 passengers per hour.

Assuming rail and bus operations were running in tandem at maximum capacity, it would have taken approximately 2.25 hours to clear 35,000 people. In 2.25 hours, rail, at a pace of 13,000 passengers per hour, can move 29,250 passengers. And bus, at a pace of 2,500 passengers per hour, can move 5,625 passengers.

At 2,500 passengers per hour, it would have taken over fourteen hours to transport 35,264 people.

For unknown reasons, NJ TRANSIT did not utilize this second loading zone on Super Bowl Sunday. It appears to us that it may have just been too difficult, considering the massive crowd, to shepherd passengers from the Pavilion 6 area across the pedestrian bridge to the designated Route 120 loading area. Theoretically, NJ TRANSIT could have moved another 2,500 passengers per hour had this area been used.

Because the buses were configured in a straight line, no bus could move until the buses in front of it moved first. This limited the ability of buses to depart on a load-and-go basis.

See E-mail from Pat Ryan, President, Party Planners West, Inc., to Richard Andreski, Rail Operations Chief of Staff, NJ TRANSIT (Aug. 20, 2013 01:38 PM EST).